Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines

109. According to Ratnākara (F.20.a), the term “beyond regressing” indicates that the continuing progress of these bodhisattvas toward perfect, complete awakening has become absolutely certain. Having succeeded in this very state of not regressing, they become those with the necessary conditions for success. The term “level of a bodhisattva” refers to an interval of time, called a “level,” during which a bodhisattva possesses a certain set of qualities. The phrase “dwelling with ease,” etc. here means dwelling perfectly, and the phrase “by means of nondwelling” refers to acting without mentally perceiving the three (i.e., agent, action, and recipient). RK: phyir mi ldog pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos pa la phyir mi ldog ces bya ba’i phyir mi ldog pa ni yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub las ldog pa med par nges pa’o| |de nyid la phan pas na phan pa’i rkyen can no| |byang chub sems dpa’i sa ni go skabs te ’di la yon tan gyi tshogs yod pas na sa ste| de la gnas pa’i legs pa zhes bya ba ni de nyid la yang dag par gnas pa’o| |ji ltar zhe na| gnas pa’i tshul gyis te| gsum mi dmigs pa’i sbyor bas so. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 58. According to Hari (46), he or she is “dwelling on” means he or she has attained and not abandoned “the level of a bodhisattva beyond regressing,” i.e., the eighth level, due to attaining the resultant state beyond regressing. We should recognize him or her “to dwell with ease” because, without attaining or abandoning anything, he or she gains the increasingly more subtle realizations to be developed in that state. And both of these ways of dwelling involve “dwelling by means of freedom from dwelling,” i.e., dwelling by means of freedom from habitual fixation (anabhiniveśa). Hari: sthitaḥ prāptāparihāṇyā avinivartanīyāyām aṣṭamyāṃ bodhisattvabhūmau tatkāryāvaivartika­tvalābhāt. susthitas tadutpādana­yogyatvenottarottara­viśeṣādhi­gamalābhād aprāptāparihāṇyā. etac ca dvayam anabhiniveśayogenety āha: asthānayogene ti.

110. According to Ratnākara (F.20.b), “in the transcendent state of wisdom” means at the initial stage of peak (on the stages of insight on path of preliminary practice). The phrase “goes about life” means by studying and contemplating. The word “cultivates” means by meditative tranquility and extraordinary insight. This refers to his or her not dwelling on physical form and so on as described. RK: |shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la zhes bya ba ni rtse mo chung ngu’i mtshan nyid la’o| |spyod cing zhes bya ba ni thos pa dang bsams pa dag gis so| |de la bsgoms pas zhes bya ba ni zhi gnas dang lhag mthong dag gis so| |gzugs la sogs pa la gnas par mi bgyi’o. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii: 60.

111. According to Ratnākara (F.20.b), the term “cumulative construction” (abhisaṃskāra) refers to “conceptualization” (vikalpa). So, he or she “would not go about life in the transcendent state of wisdom” because he or she would be going about in nothing but a conceptualization. RK: gzugs mngon par ’du byed pa zhes bya ba ni gzugs la rnam par rtog pa’o| |’di la spyod pa ma lags so zhes bya ba ni ’di la rnam par rtog pa nyid kyi phyir ro. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii: 60. According to Hari (48), a meditative perspective (ākāra) is just the mode of perceiving a meditative reference point (ālambanam). A meditative reference point to be perceived (grāhya) is just shaped by that meditative perspective, since the state of knowing is dwelling in that scope. Hence, if a bodhisattva dwells on physical form from a meditative perspective of impermanence and so on, then he or she goes about life in a “cumulative construction” of physical forms, i.e., in the “conceptualization” that applies to physical forms. Thus, the bodhisattva here would not be going about life in the transcendent state of wisdom, but, chiefly, in the initial part of the peak stage (of the path of preliminary practice). Hari: ālambana­grahaṇaprakāra evākāraḥ. saṃvinniṣṭhā ca viṣayasthitir ity ākārānurūpam evālambanaṃ grāhyaṃ. ato yadi rūpe ’nityādibhir ākārais tiṣṭhati tadā rūpābhisaṃskāre rūpābhogavikalpe carati. evaṃ ca na carati prajñāpāramitāyāṃ mukhyato mṛdu mūrdhasvabhāvāyām. Note: the Sanskrit word abhisaṃskāra used here‍—which can mean “cumulative construction” or “accumulation”‍—is central to the wordplay in the eighteenth chapter that makes reference to this very passage: “Blessed One, the Blessed One previously taught that a cumulative construction (abhisaṃskāra) is a conceptualization (vikalpa). So why is the Blessed One now saying that a bodhisattva great being would ‘earn more merit’?” (see 18.18 and n.951).

112. According to Ratnākara (F.20.b), the state of complete knowing here is referring to the knowing of all things (vastu; dngos po). RK: thams cad mkhyen pa nyid la zhes bya ba ni dngos po thams cad mkhyen pa’o. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 60. Note: The term “state of complete knowing” (sarvajñatā; thams cad mkhyen pa ) in this scripture is interpreted differently in different contexts by commentators as referring to the fruitional state of the transcendent state of wisdom at the level of either a disciple (who knows all things), a bodhisattva (who knows all paths), or a buddha (who knows all aspects of everything). The above comment means that this “state of complete knowing” is referring to a “state of complete knowing” in which a disciple and solitary realizer go beyond cyclic existence.

113. According to Ratnākara (F.21.a), the word “nonapprehending” refers to a subject not mentally perceiving and the word “not apprehended” refers to an object not being mentally perceived. RK: | yongs su mi gzung ba zhes bya ba ni gzung bar bya ba ma yin pa’o. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 61. According to Hari (50), in this sentence the idea is that what is affirmed and denied belong to different (i.e., relative and absolute) dimensions of perception. Hari: yaś ca rūpasyāparigraho na tad rūpam ityādi. vidhipratiṣedhayor bhinnaviṣayatvād iti bhāvaḥ. Note: The English translation here follows Ratnākara and Hari’s glosses of the Sanskrit “nonapprehending of form” (rupasyāparigraha), which diverges slightly from the Tibetan “unapprehended form” (gzugs yongs su ma gzung ba).

114. According to Ratnākara (F.21.a), the meditative concentration is “vast” in terms of its vast scope; “highly esteemed” by all buddhas who praised it; and “focused on what is beyond measure” indicates its certainty with respect to buddhahood. RK: |dmigs pa yangs pas na yangs pa’o| |sangs rgyas thams cad kyis bsngags pas mdun* du bgyis pa’o| |tshad med pa ni sangs rgyas nyid do| |de la nges pa ni tshad med par nges pa’o. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 61. According to Hari (49), it is described as being “focused on what is beyond measure” because it is devoted to (viz. focused on) the complete knowing of everything or because it is determined to benefit (viz. focused on benefiting) infinite beings through vast compassion and wisdom. Hari: sarvākārajñatāpratiniyamāt urukaruṇāprajñāyogena vāpramāṇa sattvārthakaraṇe niyatatvād apramāṇaniyataḥ. Note: The Sanskrit word samādhi is often defined as the state of single-pointed focus on an object, but refers to something different in the cognitive and meditative contexts. In the cognitive context (of the Abhidharma discourse on mind), samādhi refers to “concentration” or “mental focus,” which is a mental factor (caitta; sems ’byung) conjoined with every momentary consciousness of an object. In the meditative context, the term implies a state of single-pointedness with any number of meditative objects. That is to say, although a meditator might have deliberately entered this state of concentration, the concentration‍—once it reaches the point of mental tranquility (śamatha)‍—effortlessly sustains itself for a certain duration of time, during which one becomes so mentally immersed or absorbed in the object of concentration that one may not even be aware that one is concentrating upon an object. With an eye toward the resultant experience, some translate samādhi as “absorption.” Perhaps originally to distinguish these two different usages, Tibetan developed two different translations of the single Sanskrit term, namely the heuristic translation “stable immersion” or “absorption” (ting nge ’dzin)‍—in the sense of being mentally absorbed in the experience of a particular object‍—and the semi-etymological translation “the mind being set in equipoise” (mnyam par ’jog pa). But interestingly, of these two Tibetan terms, the latter seems to be used exclusively in the meditative context where one deliberately concentrates upon an object, while the former is used both in cognitive and meditative contexts where one may be unaware of concentrating.

115. This alludes to the anecdote of a mendicant named Śreṇika Vatsagotra (Pali: Vacchagotta), not initially a follower of the Buddha, who despite his narrow and limited scope acquired faith in the Buddha. The anecdote is mentioned as significant not only in this text but in all the long Prajñāpāramitā sūtras in equivalent passages, i.e., in chapter 11 of the Ten Thousand (Toh 11, 11.31–11.33); chapter 8 of the Eighteen Thousand (Toh 10, 8.35–8.38); chapter 5 of the Twenty-Five Thousand (Toh 9, 5.52–5.54); and chapter 5 of the Hundred Thousand (Toh 8, 5.423–5.441). None of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras themselves give further detail, and Śreṇika Vatsagotra’s questioning of the Buddha does not seem to appear in full in any canonical text in Tibetan translation. It is, however, related in a number of Pali texts and Chinese āgamas; see particularly Majjhimanikāya, 71–73, and Saṃyuktāgama, SA 962–964 and SA2 196–198. Nāgārjuna’s Mahā­prajñā­pāramitā­śāstra gives further details; see Lamotte 2010 vol. 1, p. 58 n119. A useful summary is set out in Conze’s introduction to the long sūtra; see Conze 1975, pp. 12–13.

116. According to Hari (50), the basic problem with grasping at signs is expressed in this sentence. That is to say, the wandering ascetic Śreṇika developed revulsion toward his own tradition because he did not foresee any liberation, even after a long period of practice, coming through a practice involved in grasping at conventional signs. So if there were something in the Buddhist teachings on the knowing of someone who has complete knowing that was to be grasped as a conventional sign, then Śreṇika would never have developed faith or trust in this teaching of the Buddha, because it would just have seemed equal to the teachings in his own tradition. Hari: yadi nimittato grahītavyā bhavet tadā svaśāsaṇe nimittagrahena dīrghakālaṃ muktim apaśyan nirviṇṇaḥ san naiv eha śāsane śreṇikasaṃjñakaḥ parivrājakas tapasvī animittayogena śraddhām abhisampratyayaṃ pratilabheta. nimittagrahasya tulyatvād iti bhāvaḥ. Note: Ratnākara explains (F.22.a) the locative pronoun “in this” to refer to the words “teaching of the Buddha.” These have been added to the main text to clarify. RK: ’di la zhes bya ba ni sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa’o). For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 61.

117. According to Ratnākara (F.22.a), into what was Śreṇika able to enter? Into the knowing of someone who has complete knowing at the intermediate stage of the peak (on the path of preliminary practice). He entered into that as someone who proceeded based on faith and trust. How did he enter? Since he entered through “a knowing limited in scope” based on a universal (i.e., of the actual nature), the knowing limited in scope means (he entered) at the intermediate stage of the peak. RK: |kun tu rgyu sde can ji lta bu la zhugs she na| de yang thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes la ste| rtse mo’i ’bring la’o| |de ltar mos par byas nas de la yang dad pas rjes su ’brang ba yin no| |gang gis zhugs pa yin zhe na? spyi las phyogs gcig gis ’byung ba yin pas | phyogs gcig gis ye shes te rtse mo ’bring la’o. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 63. According to Hari (50–51), Śreṇika “had firm conviction”‍—which he maintained mentally‍—in this signless “knowing of someone who has complete knowing” as something that would lead to buddhahood. He is called “someone who proceeded based on faith” (śraddhānusārī) because, even though his capacity for learning the teachings intellectually was relatively weak, he was able to follow the path because of his faith. He “entered” into the path where he did “through a knowing limited in scope,” which is to say, his knowing was connected only with the lack of personal identity (i.e., not with the lack of identity of all things). Hari: atrānimitte tathāgata­tvāvāhakatvena sarvajñajñāne ’tannimittam adhimucyādhimokṣa­manaskāraṃ kṛtvā mṛdvindriyatvena śraddhayā mārgānusaraṇāc chraddhānusārī pradeśikena pudgala­nairātmya­jñānenāvatīrṇaḥ. Note: Ratnākara appears to disagree with Hari, saying that Śreṇika saw the actual nature, not just a person’s lack of identity. Also, the phrase “knowing limited in scope” (prādeśika) would be translated, based on the Tibetan rendering, as “knowing a single aspect of the whole” (phyogs gcig pa’i ye shes, *ekadeśajñāna).

118. According to Ratnākara (F.22.a), after entering the path because he had done what he was taught, the reason why he personally did not grasp physical form and so on was because he did not pay attention to any conventional signs. RK: |de zhugs nas gang byas pa de bstan pa’i phyir gzugs la sogs pa yongs su mi ’dzin zhes gsungs te| de’i mtshan ma yid la mi byed pa’i phyir ro. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 63. RK: de zhugs nas gang byas pa de bstan pa’i phyir gzugs la sogs pa yongs su mi ’dzin zhes gsungs te| de’i mtshan ma yid la mi byed pa’i phyir ro. According to Hari (51), the phrase “after entering it” indicates that it was some time later that he eventually became able not to pay attention to any conventional signs.

119. According to Ratnākara (F.22.a), the phrase “delight or ease” here refers to that which is said to be born from meditative concentration (samādhi). Also, the phrase “he did not even identify” and so on refers to his not paying attention to any conventional signs (i.e., belonging to the constituents, such as physical form and so on). When the scripture says that his knowing was neither something “outside physical form” nor “outside consciousness,” it is because, even though he was not paying attention to the conventional signs of physical form and so on, they continue to appear (at least, at this level of practice). For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 63. RK:  |ting nge ’dzin las skyes pa’i dga’ ba dang bde ba dang ldan pa shes pa de yang dag par rjes su mi mthong ngo| |shes pa de gzugs kyi nang na yang dag par rjes su mi mthong zhes bya ba la sogs pas kyang de’i mtshan ma yid la mi byed pa de nyid du bstan to| |gzugs las gzhan du yang ma yin| rnam par shes pa las gzhan du yang ma yin| de’i mtshan ma yid la mi byed kyang de dag snang ba’i phyir ro. According to Hari (51), Bhadanta Vimuktisena explains that, when cultivating that meditative state, he does not identify that knowing‍—which is cultivating the freedom from signs‍—through any conventional signs connected with the “delight or ease” that has arisen from it. Here, the word “delight” refers to the mental factor of mental well-being, whereas the word “ease” refers to the physical sense of relaxed flexibility. Both of these arise because, as someone free of worldly desire, he has entered the path based on either the first or second of the form meditations (where “delight or ease” are said to automatically occur). Hari: nāpi tatrānimittabhāvanāyām utpannena prītisukhena tad bhāvakaṃ jñānaṃ nimittataḥ samanupaśyati. tatra prītiḥ saumanasyaṃ caitasikaṃ. sukhaṃ prasrabdhiḥ kāyikī. sa hi laukikavītarāgaḥ prathama­dvitīya­dhyānānyatara­saṃniśrayeṇāvatīrṇa iti bhadantavimuktisenaḥ.

120. According to Hari (51–52), this section basically shows that Śreṇika was not someone who proceeds based on the truth (dharma) by understanding reality through his sharp intellect, but rather was someone who proceeds based on faith with firm conviction in this “way of proceeding,” i.e., at the particular stage of practice corresponding to the level of proceeding with firm conviction. Hari: atretyādi. atrāsmin padaparyāye yogasthānaviśeṣe ’dhimukti­caryābhūmau sthitaḥ śreṇiko ’dhimukta iti veditavyo nādhigata iti. yataḥ śreṇiko ’tra sarvatrānimitte sarvajñajñāne tattvānadhigamena śraddhānusārīty ucyate. tīkṣṇendriyatvena tattvādhigame tu dharmānusārī bhavatīty abhiprāyaḥ. According to Ratnākara (F.21.b–22.a), the “way” (paryāya<rab tu dbye ba; prakāra) of “proceeding” (pada) here belongs to the peak, or, to be precise, the intermediate phase of the peak of the path of preliminary practice. RK: |tshig gi rnam grangs ’di la zhes bya ba la tshig ni rtse mo’i’o| |de’i rnam grangs ni rab tu dbye ba ste| rtse mo ’bring gi zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 63. Note: The translation “way of proceeding” interprets Ratnākara’s gloss of pada to mean a “step” or “place” rather than “words” or “text” (tshig) as the Tibetan translator translated it. Cf. MW pada, “step”; PTSD pada, “place, path.” Conze translates this same Sanskrit compound as a “scripture passage.”

121. The scripture here seems to be playing on the Sanskrit word dharma. Ratnākara and Hari disagree on whether to interpret the word dharma to mean “things” (dharma) or “teachings” (dharma). The translation “true nature of Dharma” (dharmatā; chos nyid) is a compromise that aims to allow for both interpretations. According to Ratnākara (F.22.a), the sentence basically means that Śreṇika took “the essence of the Buddha’s teachings” (dharmatā) to be authoritative. RK: chos nyid ces bya ba la sogs pa gsungs te| ston pa’i bstan pa tshad mar byas nas de ltar mos pa zhes bya’o. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 63. According to Hari (52), it was by force of Śreṇika’s former penetration of the truth that he took the “true nature of things” (dharmatā; chos nyid) and the transcendent state of wisdom as authoritative (pramānīkṛtya), i.e., as noncontradictory. For this reason, when he “had firm conviction,” it was free from conventional signs. Hari: dharmatām ity ādi. pūrvāvedhabalāt prajñā­pāramitādharmatām avisaṃvādena pramāṇīkṛtyaivam animitta­tvenādhimukte.

122. According to Hari (52), the meaning here is that, because of the foregoing, he neither “apprehended”‍—i.e., falsely supposed‍—nor “mentally perceived” anything as existing. Hari: tasmāt tena na kaścid dharmo ’dhyāropataḥ parigṛhītaḥ nāpi vidyamāna­tvenopalabdhaḥ. Cf. Sparham 2006, p. 238.

123. According to Hari (52), it is said that, as a doorway to the true nature of things, the meditative perspective does not create a (new) identity through negating inherent nature. In this regard, the story of Śreṇika is aimed at making known the way that someone who had emerged from a tīrthika (i.e., not Buddhist) concentrative state was able‍—only by force of his firm conviction‍—to directly witness the meaning of this teaching. Hari: etad uktaṃ: svabhāva­pratiṣedhenāsvīkāro rūpādīnāṃ dharmatāmukhenākāra iti. tatra śreṇikodāharaṇaṃ tasya tīrthika­sambandhena samādher vyutthita­syādhimokṣa­balenaiva tadartha­pratyakṣasākṣitva­jñāpanārthaṃ.

124. The Dharmasaṃgraha (76) lists the ten powers as follows: (1) the power of knowing what occurs and what cannot occur; (2) the power of knowing the maturation of actions; (3) the power of knowing the various elements; (4) the power of knowing the various inclinations; (5) the power of knowing the superior and inferior capacities of beings; (6) the power of knowing the path to anywhere; (7) the power of knowing the reflections, liberations, meditative concentrations, meditative states, defilements, purifications, and arisings; (8) knowing the memories of former states of existence; (9) knowing death and rebirth; and (10) knowing the extinction of worldly influences. See also The Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Lines (Toh 9), 9.37; and Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings (Toh 317), 1.84–90. There are slight variations among lists.

125. The Dharmasaṃgraha (77) lists the four grounds for self-confidence as follows: (1) the self-confidence of being perfectly awake with respect to all things, (2) the self-confidence that all worldly influences have been permanently destroyed, (3) the self-confidence of having accurately ascertained and explained those factors that impede awakening, and (4) the self-confidence concerning the way that the path leads beyond cyclic existence to all the accomplishments. See also The Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Lines (Toh 9), 9.38–41; and Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings (Toh 317), 1.91–94.

126. The Dharmasaṃgraha (76) lists the eighteen distinctive qualities as follows: (1) never any shakiness in understanding, (2) no useless speech, (3) never robbed of memory, (4) never an unfocused mindset, (5) never conceiving of differences (among beings), (6) never an unconsidered indifference, (7) never losing interest in anyone or anything, (8) never giving up on heroic deeds, (9) never abandoning mindfulness, (10) never lacking in concentration, (11) never lacking in wisdom, (12) never lacking in liberation, (13–15) all his physical, verbal, or mental activities are accompanied and preceded by awareness, and (16–18) his seeing and being aware of the past, present, and future is unattached and unhindered. See also The Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Lines (Toh 9), 62.74; and Distinctly Ascertaining the Meanings (Toh 317), 1.96. There are slight variations among lists.

127. According to Hari (56), the overall idea here is that, as a rule, a bodhisattva approaches each particular realization one by one through increasingly subtle, particular meditative reference points and so on. In the sentence, the Sanskrit word hi has a restrictive sense, meaning things are “never even” born. Furthermore, since all things are in constant momentary flux (i.e., arising and ceasing are simultaneous), they cannot be “gone beyond” in the manner of a born thing ceasing‍—in other words, nothing (i.e., no one) reaches nirvāṇa. The precise meaning at this stage of practice is this: the meditative reference point, i.e., the physical form and so on, is distinguished as nonarising and nonceasing because it lacks any substantive inherent nature. Cf. Sparham 2006, p. 238. Hari: ajātā hītyādi. uttarottarālambana­viśeṣādibhir adhigamaviśeṣe niyamena yāsyatīti bhāvaḥ. ādyo hiśabdo ’vadhāraṇe. ajātā evety arthaḥ. kutaḥ. yasmāt kṣaṇikānityatayā jātidharmanirodhenāniryātā na nirvāṇaṃ gatāḥ sarvadharmā iti. prakṛtya­svabhāva­tvenānutpādānirodha­viśiṣṭaṃ rūpādy ālambanam iti yāvat. Note: Ratnākara does not comment on this particular sentence. The translation “not gone beyond” (aniryātā) follows Degé (nges par ’byung ba), Bendall Add 866, and Ratnākara’s and Hari’s lemmas, rather than Mitra’s Sanskrit edition, which has “not born after” (anirjātā) for “not gone beyond” (aniryātā). The scribal confusion of these two terms is rather common, because they look similar in many Sanskrit scripts.

128. According to Hari (56), given the Sanskrit principle that all verbs of motion have the meaning of understanding, the phrase “going about life in such a manner” means cultivating as described before, and the word “approaches” means he or she is on the verge of attaining realization shortly thereafter. Hari: evam anantaroktanyāyena carato bhāvayataḥ, sarve gatyarthā bodhārthā iti kṛtvā, āsannībhavati śīghrādhigamaprāpter nikaṭavartinī syāt.

129. According to Hari (56–57), the phrase “for the sake of causing beings to mature” relies on the fact that the maturation of beings comes from one’s having directed positive qualities toward those beings. As for the other parts of this sentence, first, he or she “refines his or her body” and so on refers to the refinement of all aspects of the body and so on by virtue of understanding the inherent nature of everything. Hence, the body comes to be refined by way of the cause‍—i.e., repeatedly practicing with the meditative perspective of refining it by causal means. In the bodily refinement, the three types of physical actions are completely refined. In the mental refinement, the three types of mental actions are completely refined. Next, the complete refinement that manifests in the thirty-two principal characteristics of a great person (mahā­puruṣa­lakṣaṇāni) arises from accomplishing the qualities of being immoveable, well trained, and fulfilled. Finally, the refinement of the buddhafield refers to the world and its beings being refined. Hari: sattvaparipācanāyeti kuśala­dharmaniyojanāt sattvaparipākāya. kāyetyādi sarva­dharma­svarūpāvabodhena kāyādīnāṃ sarvākāraviśuddhir iti viśuddhihetutvād viśuddhyākāreṇa hetu­mukhenābhyasanāt kāyapariśuddhir bhavati. pariśuddhaṃ trividhaṃ kāya karma. cittapariśuddhiḥ pariśuddhaṃ trividhaṃ manaskarma. sthānasthottapta­pūrṇatvena niṣpatter dvātriṃśanmahā­puruṣa­lakṣaṇa­pariśuddhiḥ. sattva bhājanayoḥ pariśuddhatā buddha­kṣetra­pariśuddhiḥ.

130. This point in the chapter corresponds to the beginning of Chapter 6 of the Twenty-Five Thousand and Hundred Thousand, and of Chapter 9 of the Eighteen Thousand.

131. The use of the word “arising” (utpāda) in this scripture stems from a realist description of the world as ultimately consisting of irreducible atoms and irreducible moments of consciousness. In this realist description, a thing that is real first arises, i.e., comes into existence; then dwells, i.e., continues to exist; and finally ceases, i.e., goes out of existence. Mahāyāna Buddhists generally argue that this notion of arising, dwelling, and ceasing is arrived at through conceptualization, and does not describe the ultimate reality. Hence, to “go about life in the arising” means, in essence, to go about life in a conceptualization, not reality.

132. In Ratnākara’s comments (F.24.b), he glosses “mental perception” as a fanciful knowing (mithyājñāna). RK: dmigs pa zhes bya ba ni log pa’i shes pa’o. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p.75. According to Hari (58), it is said that as long as the bodhisattva goes about life based on grasping conventional signs through habitual fixation, he or she is afflicted by signs, and hence falls into the affliction of cyclic existence based on his or her own mental perception of things. Hari: evaṃ manyate: yāvad abhiniveśayogena nimittagrahāc carati tāvan nimittakleśā bodhisattvā iti vacanād upalambhamūle saṃsārakleśe patatīti.

133. According to Hari (58), what “not skilled in means” refers to here should be recognized from the introduction of its opposite (i.e., what “skilled in means” refers to). Hari: anupāyakuśalo viparyāsapravṛttatvād veditavyaḥ. The Dharmasaṃgraha (111) mentions three types of “means” (upāya) in which a bodhisattva is skilled: (1) helping all beings understand, (2) doing beneficial things for all beings, and (3) awakening happiness with ease. Dharmasaṃgraha: upāyas trividhaḥ, tadyathā – sarva­sattvāvabodhakaḥ, sattvārthābhāvakaḥ, kṣiprasukhābhisaṃbodhiś ceti. The Bodhisattvabhūmi (264.7–9) lists six “means” of benefiting beings, through (1) going along with (positive deeds), (2) standing as a hindrance (to negative deeds), (3) disposing oneself differently, (4) creating support, (5) counteracting what is done, and (6) being pure. Bodhisattvabhūmi: ānulomikaḥ, vibandhasthāyī, visabhāgāśayaḥ, avaṣṭambhajaḥ, kṛtaprakṛtikaḥ, viśuddhaś ca ṣaṣṭha upāyaḥ. For a translation of the section, see Engle 2016, pp. 439–47.

134. There is a play on the words “not skilled in means” (anupāyakuśala) and the words “goes close to” (nopaiti), both of which are forms of Sanskrit verb upa+√ī. Etymologically speaking, the word “means” (in the phrase “not skilled in means”) refers to something that enables one to “go close” to the goal. So, just above, when he spoke about a bodhisattva “not being skilled in means” (anupāya), it meant someone without the skill to “go close to” (upāya) the goal. But here he speaks about a bodhisattva who is skilled in means, saying, effectively, that the bodhisattva does “not go close to” the thoughts, etc., that will be described. In essence, the wordplay is differentiating skill in means as “going close to” the right thing from the lack of skill in means, which is “going close to” the wrong things.

135. According to Hari (61), it is in the true nature of things that the previous buddhas formally “foreordain” a practitioner (by announcing his or her future awakening) when he or she has perfected meditative concentration. Hari: vyākṛto ’yam iti dharmataiṣā samyak­prati­panna­samādher yogino buddhair vyākaraṇaṃ kriyata. Note: This foreordaining by the buddhas occurs while the bodhisattva is still on the path but is certain to reach the goal. It often includes their saying when, where, and with what name that particular bodhisattva will attain buddhahood.

136. The English translation “[not] experienced” (na saṃvidyate; ma mchis) is based on context and Sanskrit etymology‍—rather than on the Tibetan “do not exist”‍—because the text is speaking explicitly about meditative concentration, and only implicitly disproving existence in a philosophical sense.

137. The translation here follows the extant Sanskrit, rather than the Tibetan, which repeats this final sentence.

138. According to Hari (64), the idea behind this restatement is to ask, “What?” Hari: kim iti bhāvaḥ. According to Ratnākara (F.24.a), this statement is expressed for Śāriputra to ask about the topic, in order to instigate the Blessed One to teach based on that very assertion he is asserting. RK: |de skad ces bka’ stsal pa dang zhes bya ba ni| gang bcom ldan ’das kyis bka’ stsal pa de nyid bcom ldan ’das kyi bka’ yin pas bstan par bya ba’i phyir skabs kyi shA ri’i bus gsol bar bya ba’i don du smras so. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 74.

139. According to Ratnākara (F.24.a), the basic question here is this: What “thing” (dharma)‍—which can refer either to a generic term, a quality, a chief principle, a being, or the constituents of experience, and so on‍—should a bodhisattva mentally perceive and train in? The Blessed One responds that they should train in no thing because they should train in all things simply lacking identity. RK: chos gang la slob pa lags zhes bya ba la| spyi sgra dang| yon tan dang| gtso bo dang| skyes bu la sogs pa la zhes bya ba’am| ’on te phung po dang khams dang| skye mched la sogs pa’i chos la dmigs nas bslab par bya| zhes dgongs so| bcom ldan ’das kyis gang la yang mi slob bo zhes bka’ stsal te| chos thams cad bdag med pa nyid la slob pa’i phyir| zhes dgongs so. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 74. According to Hari (64–65), the bodhisattva “does not train in any thing” ultimately, because it would be a conceptualization founded upon a generic thing (vastumātra) and hence would be tied to erroneous understanding. Hari: evaṃśikṣamāṇaḥ śāriputra bodhisattvo mahāsattvo na kasmiṃścid dharme śikṣate| tatra vastumātrādhiṣṭhāna­vikalpena viparyāsānuṣaṅgāt paramārthato na kvacid ity āha bhagavān: na kasminścid dharme śikṣata iti.

140. This passage involves a play on words stemming from different meanings of the Sanskrit root verb √vid (i.e., to find, to encounter, to experience, to know, to be aware, to exist, etc.) and sam√vid (to know, to recognize, to exist, etc.). A few added words aim to allow the spirit and meaning to come through. But it should also be kept in mind that the translation “not experienced” (saṃvidyante) can be taken as a synonym of “do not exist.” According to Ratnākara (F.24.a), the question “why” asks how can he or she train but not in any things. In the answer that follows, the word “things” refers to substances, qualities, and functions. The correlative phrase “those things are not experienced” refers to the essence of things. In the relative phrase “in the same manner that they are fixated upon,” the words “in the same manner that” mean with whatever nature they are “fixated upon” as truly possessing. The term “ordinary persons” refers to the fact that they are not noble persons, which is also why they are called “immature.” Their lack of significant learning is why they are called “uninformed.” RK: |bcom ldan ’das kyis gang la yang mi slob bo zhes bka’ stsal te| chos thams cad bdag med pa nyid la slob pa’i phyir| zhes dgongs so| |de ci’i phyir zhe na | zhes bya ba ni de chos thams cad la mi slob pa ga las she na| lan ni shA ri’i bu zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs so| |chos de ni zhes bya ba ni rdzas dang| yon tan dang las la sogs pa’o| |de bzhin du zhes bya ba ni de’i ngo bo’o| ji ltar zhes bya ba ni ji lta bu’i ngo bos mngon par chags shing bden pa nyid du’o| |so so’i skye bo ni ’phags pa ma yin pa ste de yang byis pa’o| |gang gi phyir thos pa dang mi ldan pa ni thos pa mang po med pa’o. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 74. According to Hari (65), after this first statement comes the answer to the question “why,” i.e., how could he or she be training without training in any thing? In the answer, the word “immature” indicates their association with the things related to emotional defilement. The term “ordinary persons” refers to their nonassociation with things related to the purification of defilement. The word “uninformed” means that they have no great learning or firm conviction in the different types of teachings. Here is the thinking: things are not experienced/do not exist “in the same manner that they are fixated upon” by those persons on account of their ignorance and conceptualization, which fancifully mentally perceives (nonexistent) things as existent. Hence, those who are training in something relative are not training in reality. Hari: tat kasya hetoḥ | na hi te śāriputra dharmās tathā saṃvidyante yathā bālapṛthagjanā aśrutavanto ’bhiniviṣṭāḥ || śikṣamāṇo ’pi kathaṃ na śikṣata iti tat kasya hetor ity āsaṅkyāha : na hītyādi. sāṃkleśikadharmayogād bālāḥ. vaiyavadānika­dharma­virahāt pṛthagjanāḥ. ta eva caivaṃvidha­dharmādhimukti­bāhu­śrutyavigamād aśrutavantaḥ. evaṃ manyate : yathāvidyāvikalpabalād vidya­mānatvenopalambhād abhiniviṣṭāḥ tathā na saṃvidyante. ataḥ saṃvṛtyā śikṣamāṇās tattvato na śikṣanta iti.

141. According to Hari (65), this question is asked because “are not experienced/do not exist” in that manner might imply that they are experienced/exist in another manner, and hence, a fault might arise from grasping another existent thing. Hari: yadi tathā na saṃvidyante ’rthāt tarhy anyathā vidyante. tathā ca bhāvagrahād doṣa ity abhiprāyeṇāha: kathaṃ tarhītyādi.

142. There is a play here on the Sanskrit word avidyā (ma rig pa), which, in order to capture the implications, might be translated as “ignorance,” “not knowing,” “something not to be known,” “something not to be found,” or “something nonexistent.” The basic idea is that “things” exist only in the minds of ignorant beings. It should be kept in mind that the same clause connective phrase “insofar as” (yathā; ci ltar)‍—which appeared in previous sentences in a slightly different sense‍—is understood here by Ratnākara and Hari, because of their philosophical differences, as having different meanings. According to Hari (65–66), after refuting the possible misunderstanding introduced in the previous sentence, the next sentence explains that even though things are described here as being nonexistent, they do not truly “exist” in that manner (i.e., as something truly “nonexistent”) either. So he says “insofar as” (yāthā)‍—here meaning “as a rule”‍—things are not experienced/do not exist, so they are experienced/do exist relatively, because they are only acceptable as such when unexamined. To make it clear: the fact that they are being experienced/existing is nothing but the fact that they are not being experienced/not existing. The overall meaning of the sentence is this: Things that are “not known as such” are called “ignorance”‍—i.e., not knowing or knowing incorrectly at the conventional level‍—based on a creative heuristic etymology, because those things “not known as such” arise because of it (i.e., ignorance). Hence, these words express the process of conceptualization based on ignorance. Hari: pravṛttaviparyāsanirākaraṇād yathā bhiniviṣṭāḥ tathā na saṃvidyanta iti yadi nāmaivam uktaṃ tathāpi tattvato na santīty āha: yathe ty ādi. yathā nyāyato na saṃvidyante tathā vicāraikaramya­tvena saṃvṛtyā vidyante. avidyamānataiva vidyamānateti yāvat. evam avidyamānās tenocyante avidye ti. evam ityādy upasaṃhāraḥ. evam avidyamānā yataḥ tena kāraṇena nairuktavidhānāt saṃvṛtyā viparītajñānam ajñānam avidyety ucyate. ity anenāvidyāvikalpo ’bhihitaḥ. According to Ratnākara (F.24.a–b), “they are not experienced” refers to something existent, because there is contrary evidence that refutes the existence of things. “They are experienced/do not exist” refers to appearances, because they are nonexistent and false by nature. The phrase “insofar as” (yāthā), in this case, has the force of a reason. And the phrase “not being known (as such)” refers to something that is deceptive. The word “ignorance” (viz. “not knowing”) refers to a particular type of ignorance. RK: |ji ltar med pa zhes bya ba ni yod pa yin te| gnod par byed pa yod pa’i phyir ro| |de bzhin du yang dag par yod de zhes bya ba ni med pa’i phyir dang| brdzun pa’i ngo bos snang ba zhes bya ba’i don to| |de ltar zhes bya ba ni bshad pa’i rigs pas so| |med pa zhes bya ba ni brdzun pa’o| |ma rig pa zhes bya ba ni ma rig pa’i khyad par yin pa’i phyir ma rig pa zhes bya ba’i don to. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 74.

143. Ratnākara and Hari interpret these sentences as concerning the eighteen ways that the five constituents of experience are conceptualized to exist as either designated (prajñapti; btags) or substantive (vastu; rdzas) “things” that are either apprehending or to be apprehended. These are to be abandoned on the path of preliminary practice. Both commentators agree that these “things” do not actually exist as such. However, the commentators‍—who reconcile the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka systems differently‍—naturally differ on the ontological upshot of saying that things do not exist. In chapter 26, the related explanation begins of the thirty-six conceptualizations. Those are to be eliminated on the path of cultivation.

144. According to Hari (65), because they are “habitually fixated on the two extremes,” i.e., eternalistic or nihilistic notions, they do not “perceive” (jānanti) with the worldy knowing through hearing and so on that things, such as names and physical forms, are impermanent, at the relative level, because their conceptualization and habitual fixation on them lacks the causal efficacy of a permanent thing. Hari: śāśvatocchedayor antayor abhiniviṣṭās tān nāmarūpādīn dharmāṃs tadabhiniveśavikalpān nitya­syārtha­kriyāvirahāt saṃvṛtyānityā eveti laukikena śrutādimayena jñānena na jānanti.

145. As mentioned previously, a “mental perception” (upalambha; dmigs pa) refers to a fanciful perception. RK: dmigs pa zhes bya ba ni log pa’i shes pa’o. Note: The same applies to this term throughout the scripture, not just here.

146. According to Ratnākara (F.24.b), “names and physical forms” refers to the constituents (skandha): “names” refers to the four nonphysical constituents and “physical forms” refers to the physical constituent. RK: ming dang gzugs la mngon par zhen pas zhes bya ba ni ming ni gzugs can ma yin pa’i phung po, gzugs ni gzugs kyi phung po yin te| de gnyis ka ni ming dang gzugs so. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 75.

147. According to Ratnākara (F.25.b), the term “reality” (bhūta) here refers to the true nature (tattva) and the word “pinnacle” here refers to the supreme or highest point. So, in other words, this term is referring to emptiness. RK: |yang dag pa ni de kho na nyid do| |mtha’ ni mchog dang rtse mo ste| |yang dag pa’i mtha’ stong pa nyid ces bya ba’i don to. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 77.

148. According to Hari (68), the word “true” here is meant in terms of the unerroneous meaning and “Dharma” here has the characteristic of an antidote. Hari: aviparītārthena satyaṃ. dharmaṃ prati­pakṣalakṣaṇaṃ.

149. According to Hari (68), we should mentally supply a few words to understand the sentence as follows: a bodhisattva does not fixate on any thing as the Dharma that purifies by means of conceptualizing something to be grasped. Hari: kaṃcid dharmaṃ vaiyavadānikaṃ, grāhyavikalpeneti śeṣaḥ. Note: The translation “anything at all as the Dharma” is attempting to capture a slight play on words here.

150. This point in the chapter corresponds to the beginning of Chapter 7 of the Twenty-Five Thousand and Hundred Thousand, and of Chapter 10 of the Eighteen Thousand.

151. According to Ratnākara (F.28.a), here not being in the hands of an unvirtuous friend‍—i.e., one who is ignoble, unlearned, and unskillful‍—is an implicit teaching, namely rejecting the unlearned and abandoning the unvirtuous friends as two things that do not support the path. RK: ji lta bu’i lag tu song na zhes na| sems dpa’ chen po sdig pa’i grogs po’i lag tu song na’o| |’dir ’am zhes bya ba’i sgra rtogs par bya ste| sdig pa’i grogs po’i lag tu song bar gyur pa’am zhes bya’o| |des pa ma yin pa dang| mi mkhas pa dang| thabs mkhas pa ma yin te| sems dpa’ chen po gang dag sems dpa’ chen po’i lag tu ma yin pa de la de skad ces bya ste don gyis de ltar bstan pa yin no| |thabs mi mkhas pa yongs su gtong ba dang| sdig pa’i grogs po yongs su spong ba rnams mi yongs su ’dzin pa rnam pa gnyis po dag go. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 84.

152. According to Ratnākara (F.28.a–b), this sentence is describing a being who has wisdom and skillfulness‍—i.e., one who teaches this way, is learned, and is virtuous friend‍—as the two things that support the path. A skillful friend is certain about and teaches all things to be essenceless, practices virtuous deeds with the knowing of someone who has complete knowing free of reference points, and dedicates these deeds to complete, perfect awakening. An unskillful friend is the opposite. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 84. RK: de bas na rab ’byor gal te zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs te| sems dpa’ mdzangs pa thabs mkhas pa yin te| de gang dag la chen po yod pa de dag la de skad ces bya ste| dge ba’i bshes gnyen gyi lag tu song ba’o| |’ dir yang ’am zhes bya ba ni sgra rtogs par ’gyur ro| |’di skad ston pa yin te| thabs mkhas pa dang| dge ba’i bshes gnyen ni yongs su ’dzin pa gzhan gnyis yin no| |de la gang chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par nges shing bstan pa dang| rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid dang ldan pa’i mi dmigs pa’i yi shes kyis dge ba’i chos rnams spyod cing de dag yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu yang dag par yongs su bsngo ba de ni thabs mkhas pa’o| |de la bzlog pa ni thabs la mi mkhas pa’o.

153. The proper name Māra means “death.” A māra is a maker of different types of obstacles for Buddhist practitioners on the path. In this scripture, Māra is personified as a single, king-like obstacle maker who commands hordes of obstacle makers trying to prevent spiritual progress or lead practitioners astray. According to Ratnākara (F.28.b), the instruction here is divided into Māra’s corruptions and his activities. The corruptions of Māra (out of which action arises) refer to his exertion of magical influence over a bodhisattva’s sense of what needs to be done physically and so on. In this way, he should be known as causing obstacles for a bodhisattva going about his or her life. The activities of Māra refers to Māra himself appearing in the guise of a buddha or another spiritual person, and leading a practitioner onto the wrong path. RK: lan ni dang de la zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs te| bdud kyi las nye bar ston pa ni ’dir bdud kyi nyes pa yang bdud kyi las yin te| bdud kyi bya ba las byung ba’i phyir dang las yin pa’i phyir ro| |ji ltar ston pa yin zhe na| ’di lta bur zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs so| |byang chub sems dpa’ rnams la bdud kyis byin gyis brlabs nas byung ba’i lus la sogs pa’i bya ba ni bdud kyi nyes pa’o| |de ltar de dag ni byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la bar chad byed pa nyid du rig par bya’o| |bdud kyi nyes pa ’di dag ces bya ba ni gang ngas khyod la bshad pa’o| |bdud kyi las shes bya ba ni bdud rang nyid sangs rgyas la sogs pa’i cha byad du byas nas lam log par ston par byed pa’o| |de bzhin du ston pa zhes bya ba de dag gis byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa las dben pa nyid du rig par bya’o. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 85.

154. According to Hari (74–75), the phrase “donned the great armor” means he or she is outfitted with the armor-like practice that will be explained (as taking a vow and practicing the six transcendent states before realizing the path of seeing). The phrase “set out on the great journey” means he or she is endowed with the practice moving forward in the very same way. The phrase “ascended in the great vehicle” means that by that very same means, he or she has driven the great vehicle up and away. To explain: it is held that he or she first sets out and later ascends in the Mahāyāna. Hari: mahāsaṃnāhasaṃnaddhasye ti saṃnāhapratipattyā vakṣyamāṇayā yuktasya. mahāyānasaṃprasthitasye ti prasthānapratipattyā tathaivānvitasya. mahā­yāna­samārūḍhasye ti tayaiva mahāyānam utkalitasya. tathā hy ādau tayā saṃprasthitaḥ paścād ārūḍha iṣyate.

155. This point in the chapter corresponds to the beginning of Chapter 8 in the Twenty-Five Thousand and Hundred Thousand, and of Chapter 11 in the Eighteen Thousand.

156. There is a play here on the word bodhisattva that cannot be represented in English. Generally, the word sattva/satva (within bodhisattva) can be interpreted to mean either a “being” or a “courageous one” (as the Tibetan translation sems dpa’ suggests), or even “spirit,” “mind,” “or consciousness.” If we artificially combine these different meanings into one, the word bodhisattva might give an overall sense of “a courageous being with a mindset aimed toward awakening.” In any event, the passage revolves around a Middle Indic play on words that depends on (a) the fact that the Middle Indic word satta could mean either “a courageous one” (sattva) or “an entanglement” (sakta) or other meanings (not applied in this particular pun), and (b) the application of Middle Indic spelling rules for internal coalescent links (sandhi) between the words “free of entanglement” (asatta) and “a courageous one” (satta), which produces an ambiguous result when compounded with the preceding word “awakening” (bodhi). The history of the terms played upon are discussed by different scholars. See, for instance, Orsborn 2012, pp. 158–68. Cf. Schmithausen 1977.

157. According to Hari (78), the freedom from entanglement with the “objective of comprehending all things”‍—which serve as meditational objects‍—means being free from entanglement with (even) an accurate meditational object that does not go against the two truths. Because of that, when that freedom from entanglement is present, the bodhisattva (i.e., a being with the objective of awakening) “realizes unsurpassable, perfect awakening” by achieving the complete refinement of the meditative focus‍—and not by any other means. Hari: yasmāt sarvadharmāṇām evālambana­sthānīyānām anubodhanārthena samyagubhaya­satyānati­kramālambanena yāsaktatā tasyāṃ satyām ālambana­viśuddhi­gamanenānuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambudhyate nānyathā. Note: RK (F.29.b) explains that Subhūti’s question and the Blessed One’s answer mark the shift to the Ornament’s fourth subtopic, “the basis for practice.”

158. There is play here on the Sanskrit word mahāsattva, translated here as “great being.” The basic idea is that “great being” means he or she has the “great,” i.e., the greatest goal or highest point (agratā), as his or her “intention.” Another way to characterize the pun in English would be to say “great being” (mahāsattva) here means “being high-minded.”

159. This point in the chapter corresponds to points within Chapter 8 of the Twenty-Five Thousand (8.59) and Hundred Thousand (8.111), and to the beginning of Chapter 12 in the Eighteen Thousand.

160. There is another play here on Sanskrit word mahāsattva, translated here as “great” (mahā) + “being” (sattva). The play on the word is that it can also be interpreted as “great” (mahā) + “nonexistence” (asattva), i.e., the great eliminator of wrong views about the existence of things that do not exist, such as self, soul, being, etc. According to Ratnākara (F.31.a), the view of a self and so on have the same meaning, namely, all these views are fixated upon some real thing according to their particular tenet system. Among the erroneous beliefs, the word “existence” (in this passage above) refers to cyclic existence, and the word “dissolution” refers to nirvāṇa. These two are determined to be the main ones. The “erroneous beliefs in nihilism” refers to a nihilistic cutting off as attaining nirvāṇa. The “erroneous beliefs in eternalism” refers to the idea that a self remains forever. The “erroneous beliefs in individuality” refers to a habitual fixation on the categories that lack inherent nature‍—i.e., the constituents of experience, elements, gateways, and so on‍—as having an inherent nature. The additional unmentioned erroneous beliefs signified by the phrase “and so on” should be understood as the list of erroneous beliefs such as clinging to the supremacy of ethical discipline and vows, and so on (found in abhidharmic sources). RK: de nas bcom ldan ’das zhes bya ba la sogs pa la dus la zhes bya ba ni skabs so| |bdag tu lta ba la sogs pa la don gcig go| |de dag gi lta ba ni grub pa’i mtha’i bye brag gis de’i dngos por mngon par zhen pa’o| |’byung ba ni ’khor ba’o| |’jig pa ni mya ngan las ’das pa’o| |de gnyis kyi lta ba ni gtso bo nyid du nges pa’o| |mya ngan las ’das pa thob pa ni chad pa yin no zhes bya ba ni chad par lta ba’o| |bdag ni rtag par gnas pa yin no zhes bya ba ni rtag par lta ba’o |lus ni phung po dang| khams dang| skye mched la sogs pa’o| |de dag gi ngo bo nyid med pa la ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen pa ni rang gi lus la lta ba’o | | ’di lta bu zhes bya ba ni ji skad du bstan pa’o| |sogs pa zhes bya ba ni tshul khrims dang brtul zhugs mchog tu ’dzin pa la sogs pa log pa’i lta ba rnams kyang rtogs par bya ba yin no. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 92. For this list of erroneous beliefs, see Pradhan’s AKBh (58).

161. There is another play here on Sanskrit word mahāsattva, translated here as “great being” but which can also be translated as “great courageous one.” This passage is explaining the bodhisattva’s greatness by emphasizing the different ways that he or she is “great” (mahā-). This passage also (a) revolves around a play on the Middle Indic word satta, which in Sanskrit could mean either “a courageous one” (sattva), “an entanglement” (sakta), a living being (sattva), “existence” (sattva), “spirit,” “mindset,” or “consciousness” (sattva), and so on, and (b) the application of Middle Indic spelling rules for internal links (sandhi) between the words “free of entanglement” or “free of existence” (asatta) and “courageous one” (satta) and so on, which produces an ambiguous result when connected to the word “great” (mahā). See, for instance, Orsborn 2012, pp. 158–68. Cf. Schmithausen 1977.

162. This point in the chapter corresponds to points within Chapter 8 of the Twenty-Five Thousand (8.76) and Hundred Thousand (8.165), and to the beginning of Chapter 13 in the Eighteen Thousand.

163. According to Ratnākara (F.33.a), this interjection “indeed” arises from his being worthy of hearing the ultimate truth. RK: kye ma zhes bya ba’i sgra ni don dam pa mnyan pa’i ’os su ’gyur pa’i phyir ro. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 100.

164. There is a play on the word “unfettered” here. The Sanskrit term translated above as “donned” (saṃnaddha) literally means that a bodhisattva great being has “tied” or “fastened” (viz. bound or fettered) the armor onto him- or herself. But since he or she is not actually attached to or entangled with awakening (or anything else), he or she is neither bound nor fettered by this armor, and hence not liberated from (putting it on) either. This is the basic idea of the pun.

165. According to Hari (618), in his explanation the master Vasubandhu says that the Sanskrit word tathatā (i.e., “actual nature”) derives from the Sanskrit suffix tā (which in this case) means the “nature” (bhāva) of being “as it is” (tathā, i.e., the way things actually are). The Sanskrit word tathatā has a shortened vowel ending (making it tatha + tā instead of tathā + tā‍—probably as an early adjectival form of the adverbial tathā). Hari: tathābhāvas tathate ty ata eva nirdeśād asya hrasvatvam ity ācāryavasubandhuḥ. Note: it is not clear in which explanation Vasubandhu says this, perhaps in his lost Paddhati? Hari makes this comment in chapter 16, not here.

166. In a realist view, something that does not arise (anutpanna) because of causes and conditions is said to be either permanently existent or permanently nonexistent. However, here, the fact that the actual nature “has not arisen” implies that it is something immediate but beyond existing or not existing.

167. This section involves a play on the Sanskrit word yāna, occurring in the terms mahāyāna or niryāna derived from the verbal root √yā. The yāna in both terms can refer either to “a means of going” or to “the action of going.” If we consider them in connection with a courageous hero (i.e., a bodhisattva great being), they also can have the sense of marching forth (like on a military conquest). Finally, the prefix nir- (in niryāna), which is translated as “beyond,” here can also mean “free of,” and hence an additional pun (on top of others) is that the great going is free of going anywhere, i.e., going nowhere or disappearing. The passage also plays on the terms “setting out” (saṃprasthāna) and “stopping” (sthāna), both derived from the verbal root √sthā. In any event, when the word māhāyāna refers to a “means,” it is translated here, according to context, as either a “great vehicle” or a “great path.” But when it refers more to the “action” of going, it is translated as “great journey.” Furthermore, since the literature of the transcendent state of wisdom sometimes employs the metaphor of a military campaign to accumulate the bounty of merit and wisdom, these words can be fruitfully imagined as, respectively, “a great chariot,” “a great highway,” or “a procession” of all beings toward awakening.

168. This point in the chapter corresponds to points within Chapter 8 of the Twenty-Five Thousand (8.215) and Hundred Thousand (8.377), and to the beginning of Chapter 15 in the Eighteen Thousand.

169. According to Ratnākara’s explanation (F.34.a), we might understand the different meanings of “going” (yāna) in the six questions as follows: (a) Since going (yāna) is by means of it, it is a “vehicle” (yāna), and hence he asks the first question “What is the great vehicle?” (b) In the phrase “how someone has set out on it,” the Sanskrit term literally means “stand forth,” which has the meaning of begun to go (yāna) toward whatever there is. Going by some means involves a vehicle (yāna; theg pa), but the action of going is what is to be done (viz. “journey”). Hence, this question suggests that by whatever means it is to be done, by that means he or she will be going. (c) Insofar as “going” (yāna) implies “going beyond cyclic existence,” he asks the question “From where does he or she go beyond?” (d) Since that “going” implies the defining characteristic of someone, he asks the question “Who has set out?” (e) Since, after going and having arrived, he or she comes to be somewhere, he asks the question “Where does he or she come to dwell?” (f) Since those with weak disposition do not go beyond cyclic existence, he asks the question “Who will go beyond by means of this?” RK (with the variant Tibetan lemmas also marked in bold): ’di dag gi dri ba drug go| (a) |’dis ’gro bas na theg pa’o| |theg pa chen po de dag gang lags zhes bya ba ni dri ba dang po’i don to| (b) |de gang ltar yang dag par ’jug pa zhes bya ba ni rab tu gnas pa ste rab kyi sgra gang na yod na ’gro ba la ’jug pa yin no| |gang gis ’gro ba de ni theg pa ste| ’gro ba ni bya ba’o| |des na gang gis bya ba des ’gro bar ’gyur ro zhes bya ba’i don to | (c) |’gro ba ni nges par ’byung ba’i don to| |des na gang nas nges par ’byung bar ’gyur zhes bya bar dri ba yin no| (d) |’gro ba ni gang zhig gi mtshan nyid yin pas des na de gang gis ’jug par ’gyur zhes dris pa yin no| (e) |’gro zhing song nas la lar gnas pa’i don yin pas des na gang du gnas par ’gyur ba zhes dris pa yin no| (f) |’dis dman pa’i rigs nges par ’byung ba ma yin te| des na des gang zhig nges par ’byung bar ’gyur zhes dris pa yin no. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, pp. 101–2. According to Hari, the Mahāyāna is not perceived. Vimuktisena explains these six questions through six interrogatives, namely “what, how, from where, by whom, in what location, and who will go beyond cyclic existence.” In other words, (a) what the practice of wisdom and compassion is, (b) how to overcome counterproductive forces, (c) from where the antidote is transcended, (d) by whom one’s level is ascertained, (e) in what location the application of antidotes relaxes (praśrabdhi), and (f) who ultimately realizes this. Hari: tatra mahāyānaṃ na jñāyata iti (a) prajñākaruṇāprayogaṃ (b) tayor anyatarāvyatirekaṃ (c) vipakṣātikramam (d) avasthānaniścayaṃ (e) prati­pakṣa­prayoga­praśrabdhim (f) adhigantāraṃ cādhikṛtya yad yathā yato yena yatra yo niryāsyatīti katamad ityādikāpadeśena ṣaṭ praśnā ity āryavimuktisenaḥ.

170. According to Ratnākara (F.34.b), these six answers explain the six aspects of the Mahāyāna, namely (a) the greatness of the immeasurable, (b) the greatness of going forth, (c) the greatness of going beyond cyclic existence, (d) greatness as defining characteristic, (e) the greatness of attainment, and (f) the greatness of resting place. The first of these can also be split into two‍—namely “immeasurable” and “beyond measure”‍—thereby making a total of seven aspects. For edited Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Aii, p. 104. RK: lan drug po ’di dag gis theg pa chen po rnam pa drug tu smras so| (a) |dpag tu med pa’i chen po nyid dang| (b) yang dag par ’jug pa’i chen po nyid dang| (c) nges par ’byung ba’i chen po nyid dang| (d) mtshan nyid chen po nyid dang| (e) thob pa’i chen po nyid dang| (f) gnas kyi chen po nyid do| (g) |yang na rnam pa bdun te gzhal du med pa dang| dpag tu med pa’i dbye bas so. Note: Words have been added to the translation of the six statements to make more obvious how they address the corresponding questions above. For instance, the impersonal Sanskrit phrasing “by whom has the great journey been set out upon?” (kena vā tan mahāyānaṃ saṃprasthitam) has been made active in both question and answer. Cf. MW prasthitam + instrumental.

171. In the extant Sanskrit versions, there are concluding sentences here that are lacking in all Tibetan sources. In Cambridge’s MS Bendall Add 866, it goes on to say, “It is in this very way that a bodhisattva great being will go beyond cyclic existence in the transcendent state of wisdom.” In Mitra’s edition, it goes on even further to say, “It is in this way that the bodhisattva great being, who has donned the great armor in this way, has set out on the great journey, and ascended in the great vehicle.”

172. According to Ratnākara’s comments (F.44.b), this sentence provides the reason for why it is called a great vehicle. Also, it should be understood here that his or her surpassing of the world is simultaneous with going beyond cycle existence, like closing one’s eyes while laughing. The reason why he or she surpasses the world is that they attain the greatness that the world has not attained, and furthermore, that attainment is the highest among the multitude of beings. In other words, the vehicle is called “great” because it is great in relation to all beings, in terms of its renunciation, and in terms of its realization. In this way, the sentence gives a basic overview of the way that the great vehicle goes beyond cyclic existence. What follows in the rest of this chapter explains different aspects of that process of going beyond cyclic existence. RK: mahāyānam ityādi| yasmād anena sadevamānuṣāsuraṃ lokam abhibhūya bodhisattvo niryāsyati tasmād idaṃ yānaṃ mahāyānam ity ucyate| abhibhūya niryāsyat īti samānakāle ktvāpratyayaḥ| saṃmīlya hasatītyādivat| kasmād asau sarvalokam abhibhavati ? tadalabhyasya | māhātmyasya lābhāt| kiṃ punas tat sattvarāśer agratāsaṃpādanam| sattvarāśimahattayā prahāṇamahattayā adhigamamahattayā ca mahat| itīdam uddeśaniryāṇam. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 142 and Aii, p. 104.

173. There is a play on the word “space” (akāśa) formed from the Sanskrit verbal root √kāś. The wordplay about the vehicle being space means, essentially, that since there is nothing but space (viz. it is spacious), there is room for all beings in the vehicle.

174. This point in the chapter corresponds to the beginning of Chapter 12 of the Twenty-Five Thousand and Hundred Thousand, and to the beginning of Chapter 20 of the Eighteen Thousand.

175. According to Ratnākara (F.45.b), Pūrṇa’s question here aims to remove others’ possible objection that talking here about the Mahāyāna is not relevant to the topic of the transcendent state of wisdom. RK: atha khalv ityādinā pūrṇasya praśnaḥ prajñāpāramitādhikāre mahāyānasya pareṣām aprastutatvāśaṅkānivṛttyarthaḥ. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 145.

176. According to Ratnākara (F.45.b), the idea here is that Subhūti is expounding the great path in conformity with the transcendent state of wisdom, because he teaches that all things on the great path lack inherent nature and because knowing that all things lack inherent nature is nothing but the transcendent state of wisdom. RK: anulomaṃ nirdiśasī ti tvaṃ hi sarvadharmān mahāyāne niḥsvabhāvān nirdiśasi| niḥsvabhāvatājñānaṃ ca teṣāṃ prajñāpāramitaiva| tasmād anulomaṃ nirdiśasīti bhāvaḥ. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 145.

177. Hari and Ratnākara naturally interpret the following paragraph from the perspective of their respective philosophical positions. According to Hari (109–11), it should generally be understood in terms of his perspective on the relative and absolute truths. According to Ratnākara (F.45.b–49.a), there are twelve statements that parallel a more expanded section in the Twenty-Five Thousand (12.9 et seq.) to communicate his interpretation of the three natures (trisvabhāva), i.e., (1–6) imagined nature, (7–8) dependent nature, and (9–12) actual nature. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, pp. 145–55 and Aii, pp. 137–50.

178. According to Ratnākara (F.46.a), physical forms and so on are, like space, limitless, on account of their emptiness. RK: rūpādaya ākāśasamāḥ rūpādiśūnyatām upādāya. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 146 and Aii, p. 140.

179. According to Ratnākara (F.46.a–b), a “thing designated to be a ‘bodhisattva’ ” refers here to the physical and mental constituents of experience called a bodhisattva. RK: bodhisattvadharmam iti bodhisattvākhyarūpādi. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 147 and Aii, p. 140.

180. According to Ratnākara (F.46.b–47.a), “a mere designation” means a name devoid of referent (artha). To explain: The name is not the nature (svabhāva) of a referent, because one sees the mere referent before the linguistic convention (saṅketaḥ). And, also, the referent is not the nature of the name, because one can ascertain (pratītiḥ) just a mere name whose referent is not found. And, since words are used even when there is no referent, a name has no referent. For this very reason, this designation has “not truly come into being” (anabhinirvṛttam), i.e., it is not established (siddham) as a designation (of a thing). RK: nāmadheyamātram iti arthaśūnyaṃ nāma| tathāhi nārthasya svabhāvo nāma, prāk saṅketād arthamātradarśanāt| nāpi nāmnaḥ svabhāvo ’rthaḥ, aviditārthasya nāmnaḥ kevalasyaiva pratīteḥ, asaty api cārthe śabdaprayogāt| nirarthakaṃ nāma| ata eva tac ca nāmadheyam anabhinirvṛttaṃ, nāmadheyatvenāsiddham. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 147 and Aii, p. 140.

181. According to Ratnākara (F.47.a), “not truly coming into being” means not really existing, because that thing does not exist the way it appears. RK: anabhinirvṛtta ity asadbhūtaḥ| yathālakṣaṇam asattvāt. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 148 and Aii, p. 142.

182. This seventh statement‍—“all things have the inherent nature of lacking any state of being”‍—follows the Sanskrit suggested by Ratnākara, who explains, philologically, why some Sanskrit manuscripts‍—including those used by the Tibetan translation and by Mitra’s Sanskrit edition‍—have a different phrase due to a scribal error and an incorrect editorial correction. Without directly commenting on this seventh statement, Hari reads it as a relative clause that must be connected to the eighth statement: “Since all things lack inherent nature…” For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, pp. 148–52 and Aii, pp. 142–46. Cf. brgyad stong pa (F.15.a): de ltar chos thams cad ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa la.

183. According to Ratnākara (F.48.a), something “not truly coming into being” means it is nothing but emptiness. RK: tat kim iti tadā katham anabhinirvṛttim iti śūnyatāmātraṃ bodhisattvam anabhinirvṛttyām iti śūnyatāmātre prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmi. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 153 and Aii, p. 152.

184. According to Ratnākara (F.49.a), Subhūti says the first two phrases‍—i.e., “neither goes close to” and “nor arrives at”‍—to negate the conceptualization of an object’s and subject’s inherent nature. That is to say, a bodhisattva does not “go close to”‍—i.e., does not mentally perceive‍—these imagined things (from physical form to consciousness, and so on, up to the qualities of a buddha), because these things do not appear to him or her. He or she does not “arrive at” them‍—i.e., does not conceptualize them‍—because the transcendent state of wisdom is beyond conceptualization. Then, Subhūti says the next two phrases‍—i.e., “nor identifies their arising, nor their cessation”‍—to refute the conceptualization of their (the subject’s and object’s) two particular characteristics. That is to say, he or she does not identify any things as arising or having ceased, because he or she does not see any things‍—such as physical forms and so on‍—as having previously arisen and as now having ceased to exist. Indeed, since imagined things do not exist in the manner of their (imagined) characteristics, there is no (such thing as their) arising or ceasing to exist, and hence, a bodhisattva does not see either of these (i.e., the particular characteristics of arising or ceasing). For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, pp. 155–56 and Aii, pp. 150–51. RK: rūpaṃ kalpitaṃ yāvad vijñānaṃ yāvad buddhadharmān nopaitī ti nopalabhate, tadapratibhāsāt. nopagacchati na vikalpayati nirvikalpatvāt prajñāpāramitāyāḥ. iti svabhāvavikalpau pratiṣiddhau. viśeṣavikalpau pratiṣeddhum āha‍— na rūpā der utpādanirodh au| pūrvam utpanno rūpā dir idānīṃ niruddha iti na paśyati| kalpitasya hi yathālakṣaṇam asattvād utpādanirodhau na staḥ| tasmād ubhau na paśyati. According to Hari (113), these sentences explain how a bodhisattva could possibly investigate the transcendent state of wisdom through a perception of physical forms and so on. To explain: Just when he or she is investigating things, namely physical forms and so on, and their causes in the transcendent state of wisdom from the perspective of their not having an inherent nature, just then he or she does not “encounter”‍—i.e., mentally perceive‍—those things and does not “arrive at” ‍—i.e., assume‍—those things, because he or she does not identify an arising or ceasing. The basic reasoning here aims to negate the existence of any other (real) thing as being free of arising or ceasing. Hari: nanu rupādyupalambhena kathaṃ prajñāpāramitām upaparīkṣata iti tat kasya hetor ity āśankyāha: yasmim hī tyādi. yasmād yasmin kāle rūpādīn imān dharmān prajñāpāramitāyāṃ tannimittaṃ vyupaparīkṣate naiḥsvābhāvyākāreṇa. tasmāt tasmin kāle na rūpan upaiti na pratipadyate. ato nopagacchati na svīkaroti yato notpādanaṃ nirodhaṃ samanupaśyati. utpāda­vyaya­nirmuktasyānyasyāsattvād iti bhāvaḥ. Note: In his Instructions, Ratnākara explains that the actual nature of all things can be considered the single, universal characteristic that belongs to all things. However, conceiving of it as a characteristic to be mentally grasped prevents it being actualized directly in experience. So, this section is presenting a refutation of the way that realists might mistakenly conceptualize the actual nature of things to be examined on the path in terms of particular characteristics, such as arising, dwelling, and ceasing. Although the actual nature of things may be described in terms of what it is not‍—i.e., not arising, not ceasing, and so on‍—these particular characteristics are not to be considered as inhering in the actual nature.

185. Based on Ratnākara’s suggestion (see previous note) that “not arising” is to be understood here as the particular characteristic (viśeṣa) of physical forms and so on, the relative-correlative construction (yad-tad; gang lags pa de) has been translated freely as “the characteristic of not arising…”‍—rather than (more literally) as “that which is the not arising”‍—throughout the passage. RK: viśeṣavikalpau pratiṣeddhum āha.

186. In order to clarify the meaning of nonduality, the former two sentences refute sameness or oneness. The following two sentences refute difference or duality. See subsequent notes for more information.

187. According to Ratnākara (F.49), the question “why” indicates an objection (to the two previous sentences) that any physical forms‍—which do not exist in the same moment‍—cannot logically be established (side by side) as two different things. Response to this objection: The terms physical forms and so on here do not refer to their dependent nature. Rather, “something free of duality” refers to the actual nature (pariniṣpanna) because only that nature neither arises or ceases. Since the actual nature of things is characterized as the nonexistence of the imagined nature, its characteristics of not arising or ceasing can also be characterized as nonexistence. Hence, the idea that these three‍—physical forms, not arising, and not ceasing‍—are not different is due to their having the same single flavor. RK: nanu tadānīṃ rūpāder abhāvād advayībhāvo na yukta ity ata āha| yat punar ityādi| nātra paratantraṃ rūpādi gṛhyate| kiṃ tarhi yad advayam utpādavyayavirahāt pariniṣpannam ity arthaḥ| pariniṣpanno hi svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ kalpitābhāva­lakṣaṇaḥ| anutpādāvyayāv api dharmāṇām abhāvalakṣaṇau| tata ekarasatvād eṣāṃ trayāṇām advayībhāva iti bhāvaḥ. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 158 and Aii, p. 152. According to Hari (114), the previous sentences could leave open the possible objection that the perception of physical forms just refers to the perception of their arising and ceasing, and hence the question means, “How could he or she not encounter physical forms?” In anticipation of this objection, Subhūti asks the rhetorical question “Why is that?” To this, he responds with the following statement. That which “neither arises nor ceases is not the same as the physical forms” since physical forms only appear at the conventional level, and hence things that remain only momentarily there in existence are actually ceasing, i.e., dissolving (also at the conventional level). Due to negating that (dissolution also), the text says next “not ceasing.” Hari: nanv aikātmye ’nutpādānirodhopalambha eva rūpopalambhaḥ. ataḥ kathaṃ na rūpam upaitīti tat kasya hetor ity āśaṅkyāha : tathā hītyādi. yasmād yāv anutpādāvyayau na tau rūpaṃ saṃvṛtyā rūpasyaiva pratibhāsanāt. tatra bhāva eva kṣaṇasthitidharmā. nāśo vyayaḥ. tatpratiṣedhād avyayaḥ. Note: The Yogācāra and Mādhyamika systems interpret nonduality differently and this affects Ratnākara’s and Hari’s interpretations of this passage. In brief, nonduality for Ratnākara means the direct knowing of sheer luminosity without any cognitive distinction between a grasping subject and an object grasped. For Hari, it means the absence of any conceptual distinction, including between ultimate emptiness and relative appearance. From these divergent perspectives, they make many comments throughout this section, most of which cannot be noted here.

188. According to Ratnākara (F.49.b), these first two sentences here refute the “nondifference” of things and their nature, whereas the next two sentences refute their “difference.” RK: evam abhedaṃ pratiṣidhya bhedapratiṣedhāyāha| ity anutpādāvyayau ca rūpādiś cādvayam etad advaidhīkāram iti. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 157, and Aii, pp. 151–52. Later in his comments on chapter 8, Ratnākara explains that these things are “something free of duality” due to their being the same, and “free from creating duality” due to their inseparability. Ratnākara glosses: advayaṃ tādātmyāt|advaidhīkāram avyabhicārāt. According to Hari (114), since diversity arises only at the conventional level, a particular physical phenomenon and its not arising or ceasing‍—the latter of which persists at the ultimate level‍—are “something free of duality.” “Here” (etad) refers to their single nature of not arising or ceasing, since it is “free from creating duality,” i.e., a valid cognition free from creating the two types of negated existence (existence and nonexistence). Hari: yataḥ saṃvṛtyā nānātvam iti tasmād anutpādāvyayau rūpaṃ ca paramārthato ’nutpādāvyayasyaiva sthiter advayam anutpādādyekarūpam etat. yato ’dvaidhīkāram apagatadvidhā bhāvakāraka pramāṇaṃ. Note: Yogācāra and Madhyamaka scholars interpret “nonduality” differently.

189. According to Hari (114), the expression “physical forms” is to quantify‍—i.e., designate‍—something free of duality as having the characteristic of not arising and so on, based on logic. Hari: advayasya nyāyenānutpādādirūpasyaiṣā rūpam ity udbhāvanāsaṃvṛtyā gaṇanā saṃjñā kṛtā saṃketitā. According to Ratnākara (F.50.a), in the phrase “is to quantify something free of duality,” that which is free of duality is a reference to the source of things (dharmadhātu). For that reason the statement “even a bodhisattva has not arisen” means that he or she is (not separate from) the source of things, on account of being free of arising. However, what is quantified (gaṇyate) here is not the nature that is dependent (i.e., consciousness of something else), since that dependent nature (of consciousness) is not the ultimate (reality, i.e., the unchanging and undeluded nature of sheer reflexive awareness), and since the ultimate is the topic being discussed (adhikāra) in this section. RK: tena hī ti yen ādvayasyaiṣā gaṇanā kṛtā| advayaś ca dharmadhātuḥ| tena kāraṇena bodhisattvo’ py anutpādaḥ| utpādavirahād dharmadhātur ity arthaḥ| paratantras tu svabhāvo neha gaṇyate| tasyāparamārthatvāt paramārthasya cehādhikārāt. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 160 and Aii, p. 155.

190. According to Ratnākara (F.50.a), the “sufferings” here refer to giving their hands, feet, heads, and bodies for the sake of sentient beings. RK: yāni duḥkhāni karacaraṇa­śiraḥśarīradānāni sattvānāṃ kṛtaśaḥ sattvānām arthāya tāni vā pratyanubhavituṃ kasmād utsahate. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 160 and Aii, p. 155.

191. From this point until the end of the chapter, the repartee reads like an extended tongue twister that playfully challenges the reader not to get lost. The Sanskrit text conspicuously even leaves off the names of the speakers, i.e., Subhūti and Śāriputra, seemingly in order to make it difficult to keep track of who is saying which line when. In accordance with the Tibetan, however, the translation here has included the names of each speaker to avoid increasing the confusion.

192. This passage plays on the ambiguity of the multivalent Sanskrit word dharma and the elusive Sanskrit words anutpāda (“free of arising,” “not arising,” “nonarising quality,” “a thing that does not arise”) and anutpanna (“free of having arisen,” “not arisen,” “unarisen quality,” “a thing that has not arisen”). To get the gist of the play on words in this section, it helps to understand three intentional ambiguities in the passage. First, the passage plays on the word dharma, which can refer either to the real thing, the characteristics, or the qualities that collectively constitute something, such as a bodhisattva (in compounds like bodhisattvadharma). So, keep this in mind when the translation reads either “qualities” or “thing.” Second, in a realist framework, if a thing or quality is said not to arise (i.e., not to come into existence), then it must be either (a) an imaginary thing that is not observably real and never will be (e.g., the horns of a rabbit) or (b) a real thing that is permanent and unconditioned (e.g., space). But, in Ratnākara’s (F.51.a–b) extensive comments on this section (which will not be translated here), he suggests that when Subhūti says “free of arising” (anutpāda), he is referring to the actual nature (dharmatā) and source of things (dharmadhātu), which we might call a space of illumination in which and out of which all things‍—from an ordinary person’s physical form and its qualities up through a buddha’s state of complete knowing and its qualities‍—appear. In other words, Subhūti is implying something that does not fit within the above dichotomy of the realist framework. On the one hand, Subhūti uses “free of arising” to mean that all so-called things (conceived as real by ordinary beings) are actually imaginary. On the other hand, “free of arising” refers to their ultimate reality as the so-called nature or source of all things. Meanwhile, Śāriputra starts from the realist perspective and only step by step comes to understand the sense in which Subhūti uses the term “free of arising.” So, there is some humor intended because Śāriputra seems to be asking which of the two realist meanings Subhūti intends, but actually Subhūti’s answers are spoken from the perspective of what we might call a third meaning beyond the realist dichotomy. Third, since a realist might understand a bodhisattva and so on as not being ultimately real‍—even while they still consider the irreducible parts of the bodhisattva to be real things (dharma)‍—the distinction between the nonarising of a bodhisattva, and so on, and the nonarising of the qualities serves as a further point of misunderstanding in their dialogue, which the commentators Ratnākara and Hari must sort out blow by blow from the perspectives of their own philosophical schools.

193. Here, the implication of Śāriptutra’s question is that if the transcendent state of wisdom entails seeing both ordinary beings and buddhas as “free of arising” equally, then there would be no difference between ordinary beings and buddhas, and the logical consequence would be that budding bodhisattvas (who are ordinary persons) would already be buddhas.

194. According to Hari (122), Śāriptutra’s question intends to object as follows: Is your (i.e., Subhūti’s) cross-examination (of me, Śāriputra) about the different stages of something not arising based on the relative or absolute truth? Hari: nanu saṃvṛti­paramārtha­satyā­śrayeṇotpādānutpāda­vyavasthāyāṃ tavāpy eṣa paryanuyoga ity abhiprāyeṇāha : utpāda eva dharmo ’nutpāda utāḥo ’nutpādo dharma utpāda iti. According to Ratnākara (F.52.a), the two alternatives problematize the moment where the dependent nature of mind is transformed into the actual nature (pariniṣpanna) of mind, i.e., the complete knowing of everything. The first alternative asks, “Is that ‘thing that arises’ (utpāda)‍—referring here to the dependent nature of mind‍—subsequently ‘free of arising’ insofar as its not arising is because of the nonexistence of a cause (i.e., ignorance)?” The second alternative (pakṣa) asks, “Or, is a ‘thing that does not arise’‍—namely the state of complete knowing‍—‘something that arises’ right afterward?” As for the first alternative, how could there be an attainment of the state of knowing of all aspects that has not arisen? As for the second alternative, the cause of the state of complete knowing of all aspects would require further explanation, and the imagination of the unreal (viz. the dependent nature) would be permanent (śāśvata), since it would not be destroyed (in the awakening process)‍—this is the idea here. RK: āhe ti śāriputra āha| kiṃ punar ityādi| utpadyata ity utpādaḥ paratantraḥ svabhāvaḥ| kiṃ punaḥ sa paścād anutpādaḥ? kāraṇābhāvād anutpatter ity ekaḥ pakṣaḥ| utāho ’ nutpādaḥ sarvākārajñatākhyo dharmaḥ pūrvam anutpannatvād sa paścād utpadyata iti dvitīyapakṣaḥ| tatrādye pakṣe ’nutpannāyāḥ sarvākārajñatāyāḥ kutaḥ prāptiḥ? dvitīyapakṣe sarvākārajñatāyāḥ kāraṇaṃ vaktavyam| abhūtaparikalpaś ca śāśvato bhavet kṣayābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 166 and Aii, p. 162. Note: The translation of the final phrase “something that arises” here follows the Skt manuscripts and commentaries by Hari and Ratnākara, rather than the negation “something that does not arise” (mi skye ba) found in the Tibetan versions.

195. According to Ratnākara (F.52.b), Subhūti is expressing an objection. Speaking of a distinction between the state of complete knowing as a thing arising and the imagination of the unreal as a thing free of arising is “not” being illuminating (pratibhāti), i.e., does not shed light (rocate). The state of complete knowing is nothing but the cessation of all errors in the stream of consciousness, when it has as its focus the emptiness of all things. Thus, the idea is that one does not need to specify the cause of that [state of knowing all aspects] nor is it the case that the imagination of the unreal would be permanent. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 166 and Aii, p. 162.

196. These five sentences involve a subtle play on words. According to Ratnākara (F.52.b), in the first sentence, “an utterance” refers to words conceived in the mind. In the second, the thing expressed by this utterance is “clear.” In the third, “illumination” refers to an understanding along with its utterances. The idea is that these three are “simply not arising” in the state of complete knowing, because all things appear in it in the form of the true nature itself. The last sentence summarizes this with the words “absolutely illuminating.” RK: jalpa iti mānasaḥ śabdaḥ| pratibhātī ti jalpābhidheyaṃ vastu| pratibhānam iti sajalpā buddhiḥ| trayam etad anutpāda eva sarvākārajñatāyāṃ dharmatāśarīreṇaiva sarvadharmāṇāṃ tasyāṃ pratibhāsād iti bhāvaḥ| evam evātyantaṃ pratibhātī ty upasaṃhāra. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 166 and Aii, p. 162.

197. According to Ratnākara (F.53.a), the phrase “common to all vehicles” (Skt. sārvayānikī) means common to the three vehicles. RK: sārvayānikī ti yānatrayasādhāraṇī. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 168. According to Hari (124), the phrase “common to all vehicles” means that the transcendent state of wisdom is included in the three vehicles as the perfection of all the levels. Hari: yānatrayasaṃgṛhītā sārvayānikī sarvabhūmipāramitā. Note: The Tibetan version suggests the transcendent state of wisdom is “all vehicles” (theg pa thams cad) instead of being common to them all. This translation follows the commentators.

198. According to Ratnākara (F.53.a), from Śāriputra’s question‍—namely “O Venerable Subhūti, how could a bodhisattva…”‍—to the end of this paragraph is an objection to what he perceives Subhūti as asserting. It arises from Śāriputra considering “attentiveness” to be a conceptualization.

199. According to Ratnākara (F.53.b), “sentient being” here refers to a self (ātman)‍—an example to illustrate the topic. “Attentiveness” here refers to a conceptualization‍—the topic that the example is illustrating here. RK: sattvam ātmā | sa iha dṛṣṭāntaḥ| manasikāro vikalpaḥ| sa dārṣṭāntikaḥ. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 169.

200. According to Ratnākara (F.53.b), “not an object of accurate understanding” means not the scope of perfect knowing. The “accurate understanding that an object is not in accordance with reality” (ayathābhūtārtha) is a phrase that refers to someone (i.e., a bodhisattva) who has perfect knowing of what is not in accordance with reality, i.e., that it is a false thing. RK: anabhisaṃbodhanatā samyagjñānāviṣayatā| ayathābhūtārtha tvena mithyāvastutvenābhisaṃbodhanaṃ saṃyagjñānam asye ti ayathābhutārthābhi­saṃbodhanatā. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 169. According to Hari (127), in the first sentence, “a sentient being is not an object of understanding” refers to the nonperception of a sentient being. In the next sentence, “a sentient being has the accurate understanding that an object is not in accordance with reality” means “accurate understanding” that a sentient being is “not in accord with reality” (i.e., it is false) Hari: sattvasyā pratipattir anabhisambodhanatā sattvānabhisambodhanatā. sattvo ’yathābhūtārtho ’līka ity abhisambodhanatā sattvā­yathābhūtārthābhi­sambodhanatā. Note: the translation of these two sentences follow the Sanskrit, Ratnākara, and Hari, which differ from the Tibetan’s opaque formulation: “Venerable Śāriputra, since a sentient being is not perfectly and completely awakened, attentiveness is not perfectly and completely awakened…” Tib: tshe dang ldan pa shA ri’i bu sems can mngon par rdzogs par byang ma chub pas na yid la byed pa mngon par rdzogs par byang ma chub par rig par bya’o…

201. Hari (126–27) and Ratnākara (F.53.b) give different, somewhat complicated commentaries about the logic of the back and forth between Śāriputra and Subhūti in these last three paragraphs about attentiveness. Their interesting explanations cannot be entirely conveyed here. But, in essence, they both seem to be suggesting that Śāriputra objects to Subhūti’s assertions about attentiveness, because he does not recognize that Subhūti is using the phrase “this attentiveness” to refer to a specific type of attentiveness, which differs from the usage of the term by common people and by schools connected with the Disciple Vehicle. In the back and forth of this passage, Śāriputra first assumes that attentiveness literally refers to being focused on a real thing separate from the mind and involves conceptualizing what to be attentive about. Then, based on Śāriputra’s narrow understanding of the term “attentiveness,” he asks a question designed to show that a bodhisattva’s transcendent state of wisdom‍—which was just described as not dependent on any things‍—cannot be described either as “never lacking attentiveness” (i.e., to real, conceptualized things), because these two descriptions are mutually exclusive. In response, Subhūti congratulates him for seeing that the transcendent state of wisdom and attentiveness (as Śāriputra construes the term) would indeed be mutually exclusive. However, Subhūti reproaches Śāriputra, essentially, for misunderstanding what Subhūti intended with the term “attentiveness” in this context. In brief, the particular kind of attentiveness, which Subhūti is asserting, is constantly attentive to the unreality of all things. Thus, in the common usage the word “attentiveness” assumed by Śāriputra, one would have to say that the bodhisattva is never attentive to things that are simply conceptualized (viz. imagined) to be real. But in Subhūti’s usage of the term “attentiveness” (i.e., attentive to things’ unreality), a bodhisattva in the transcendent state of wisdom is “never lacking attentiveness,” because the transcendent state of wisdom involves always seeing things as empty without being distracted from their unreality. So, Śāriputra’s objection is correct only insofar as common usage is concerned, but not with respect to the intended meaning of Subhūti’s words above. Interestingly, elsewhere, practicing this kind of “attentiveness” (manasikāra, i.e., to unreality) is also referred to as practicing “nonattentiveness” (amanaskāra or amanasikāra), in which one ceases to attend to whatever arises in a purely conceptual mindset. Cf. Hari (127) kathaṃ punar amanaskāra eva manaskāro na tu yathāruta….

202. According to Ratnākara (F.53.b), “this kind of attentiveness” refers to the type that investigates what really exists as explained above. The word “state” (vihāra) here indicates that it is a form of tranquility meditation (śamatha). RK: anene ti yathoktena| evaṃrūpeṇe ti bhūtārthapratyavekṣakeṇa| vihāreṇe ti śamatharūpeṇa. For edited Sanskrit and Tibetan text, see Seton 2016, Ai, p. 169.

203. The beginning of this chapter corresponds to the beginning of Chapter 14 in the Twenty-Five Thousand and Hundred Thousand, and of Chapter 22 in the Eighteen Thousand.

204. Śakra (lit. “mighty”) is another title for Indra (lit. “powerful”), and the Buddha and others when directly addressing him use his personal name Kauśika. The Heaven of Thirty-Three is part of the desire realm. In this paragraph, the epithets have not been capitalized, and have been translated freely.

205. Ratnākara (F.54, Jaini 21) and Hari (129, Sparham II–III, p. 71) add the names of the “Four Guardians of the World,” who are the same as the Four Great Kings and, as the lowest category of gods in the desire realm, are each associated with one of the four directions: Vaiśravaṇa (also called Kubera), Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Virūḍhaka, and Virūpākṣa. Note: Here, the number “forty thousand” (bzhi khri) is based on Tibetan, rather than on the Sanskrit “four hundred thousand” (catvāriṃśatā). RK: catvāro mahārājā vaiśravaṇadhṛtarāṣṭravirūḍhakavirūpākṣā caturādiṣu dikṣu| teṣāṃ kāyaḥ| tasmin bhavāḥ. Hari: kuveradhṛtarāṣṭravirūpākṣavirūḍhakāś catvāro lokapālāḥ.