The Vimalakīrti Sūtra

1. Skt. acintyavimokṣa. See Chapter 12.

2. See Lamotte (Appendice, Note III, pp 407-413).

3. See Lamotte’s discussion of this concept (Lamotte, Introduction, pp 33-37), even though he emphasizes the rhetorical meaning more than the behavioral meaning.

4. The Guhya­samāja­tantra (see Bibliography) is generally recognized as one of the earliest systematic tantric texts. It expounds a philosophically pure Middle Way nondualism, combined with an explicit teaching of the reconciliation of dichotomies (i.e., how even evil can be transmuted to enlightenment, etc.) and an elaborate meditational methodology, employing sacred formulae (mantra), rituals, and visualizations. The meditation of jewels, buddhas, sacred universes (maṇḍala), etc., as existing in full detail inside a mustard seed on the tip of the yogin’s nose is a characteristic exercise in the Guhyasamāja, as in Chap. 3.

5. See 2.3. It is especially appropriate, in the light of the early tantric tradition, for Vimalakīrti, as a layman, to be an adept.

6. See 7.1-7.15, where Vimalakīrti states that the “wrong way” leads to buddhahood, Mañjuśrī that all passions constitute the “tathāgata-family” (itself an important tantric concept), and Mahākaśyapa that only those guilty of the five deadly sins can conceive the spirit‌ of enlightenment‌. The Guhyasamāja (V.4) states: “Even those who have committed great sins, such as the five deadly sins, will succeed on the buddha-vehicle, there in the great ocean of the Mahāyāna” (ānantarya­prabhṛtayaḥ mahā­pāpakṛto ’pi ca | siddhyante buddhāydne ’smin mahā­yāna­mahodadhau ||). It then goes on to list in Vimala­kīrti­nirdeśa fashion all sorts of terrible crimes of lust and hatred, ending with the phrase that such “a mentally nondualistic, intelligent person’s buddhahood is attained” (siddhyate tasya buddhatvaṃ nirvi­kalpasya dhīmataḥ ||).

7. See 7.17. In the tantric male-female symbolism of the Guhyasamāja and other tantras, the female consort is called the “Wisdom” (prajña) and the male the “Liberative Technique” (upāya), and the bell (ghaṅṭa) and diamond-scepter (vajra) also symbolize female and male, respectively.

8. See 5.17. This type of yogic power is classified as a lesser attainment (siddhi), the superior attainment being buddhahood, in all tantric methodologies.

9. See 6.30. The Guhyasamāja elaborates the symbolism of the “Five Tathāgatas,” the leaders of the tathāgata-families, who are usually called Vairocana, Amitābha, Akṣobhya, Ratnasaṃbhava, and Amoghasiddhi, and thus correspond to the tathāgatas listed by the goddess too closely to be merely coincidentally related. Tathāgata­guhyaka, further, is a subtitle of the Guhyasamāja itself.

10. Vimalakīrti’s special relation to the Tathāgata Akṣobhya (see 11.9) is highly significant in this context, as Akṣobhya is central among the “Five Tathāgatas,” occupying the heart in the esoteric methodology which locates the five in the five important spots in the human body.

11. Also transliterated Yen Fo-t’iao; his translation, like some of the other early translations, has not survived. See Lamotte p 2 et seq.

12. The other Tibetan translation (or translations) by unknown translators surviving only in some of the fragments found at Dunhuang; these fragments may represent two different versions. See Lamotte p 19.

13. See bibliography.

14. This list of qualities of the noble disciples (āryāśravāka) is absent in the Chinese of K and X. It is, however, frequently found in Mahāyāna sūtras (see Lamotte, p 98, n 2).

15. This phrase is absent in Tib. but is included in K and X.

16. The ten transcendences (daśapāramitaḥ), which correspond to the ten stages (daśabhūmayaḥ) of the bodhisattva.

17. According to the Degé and Stok Palace Kangyurs, which correspond to the Sanskrit text’s anu­palambhānutpattika­dharma­kṣānti-samanvāgataiḥ. The Yongle, Lithang, Peking, Narthang, Cone, and Lhasa Kangyurs all omit dang mi skye ba’i.

18. Tib. mtha’ dang mtha’ med par lta ba’i bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba kun bcod pa; Skt. antānanta­dṛṣṭi­vāsanābhi­saṃdhi­samucchedaka. “Convictions concerning finitude” refers to two sorts of extremism, absolutism and nihilism, and “convictions concerning infinitude” refers to convictions that hypostatize voidness (i.e., infinity, etc.) as a self-existent entity. Thus the bodhisattvas are said here to have realized, even on the subconscious level, both the voidness of things and the voidness of voidness.

19. The list has been revised to ensure that the names match those in the Sanskrit text, although there are a few differences in order and content. For exhaustive references concerning the presence of some of these bodhisattvas in other Mahāyāna sūtras, see Lamotte, pp 100-102, ns. 12-33. The Chinese lists in K and X vary somewhat; see Luk, pp 3-4, for K; and Lamotte, p 102, for X. For information about the more well-known bodhisattvas, see glossary.

20. Tib. dkon mchog ’byung gnas (lit. “Jewel-Mine”). The Chinese versions give his name as “Jewel-Ray” (Ratnarāśi), although the Skt. Ratnākara is supported by his appearance in a number of other Mahāyāna sūtras, where he is also identified as a Licchavi, a merchant’s son, and a great bodhisattva of the tenth stage, as well as by the Sanskrit manuscript. For full references, see Lamotte, p 103, n 38.

21. The jewels were gold, silver, pearl, sapphire, ruby, emerald, and diamond, although various sources alter this list slightly.

22. Skt. tri­sāhasra­mahā­sāhasra­loka­dhātu. The term “galaxy” was chosen to evoke the sense of inconceivable scope intended by the original Skt. term, as such cosmological terms were never aimed at material precision, but rather at triggering an imaginative vision of inconceivable cosmic immensity. I have modified the following catalogue of objects and places to conform to a more modern cosmology.

23. This list of mountains, according to Lamotte (p 104, n 41), occurs in other Mahāyāna sūtras but does not correspond to usual Buddhist cosmology, except for the fact that Sumeru, mentioned first, is in the center (of each world) and Mount Cakravāḍa, actually a mountain range, is mentioned and surrounds each world of four continents. This list is first in the order of the Tibetan.

24. Tib. zhi gnas pha rol phyin mchog brnyes; Skt. śamathā­pāramitāgraprāpta. Śamathā can be adequately rendered “mental quiescence” when it refers in general to one of the two main types of Mahāyāna meditation; the other is “transcendental analysis” or “analytic insight” (vipaśyana). In this verse, however, Ratnākara refers to it in its aspect of final attainment; hence “trance” best conveys the sense of extreme one-pointed fixation of mind.

25. Tib. skyes bu’i khyu mchog; Skt. puruṣarṣabha. This common epithet of the Buddha contains the simile comparing him to the chief bull of a herd of cattle because of his power and majesty.

26. Tib. ’chi med ’gro; Skt. amṛtaga (lit. “goes to deathlessness”). The buddhas’ teachings lead to nirvāṇa; in nirvāṇa there is no birth, and where there is no birth there is no death.

27. The subtle difference here between Tib. and Ch. of K and X is noteworthy. Tib. causally relates “deep analysis of things” (Skt. dharma­prabedha) to the teaching of their ultimate meaning, which accords with the Indo-Tibetan emphasis on “transcendental analysis” (vipaśyana) as indispensable for realization of the ultimate nature of things. Ch. (both K and X) puts the two (analysis and the ultimate) in opposition, saying, “(You are) expert in analysis of the nature of all things, (yet are) unmoved with respect to the ultimate meaning, (as you have) already attained sovereignty with respect to all things.”

28. The fact about Buddhist doctrine that most baffled ancient critics is that the cause and effect of karma operates without any ego principle to link the doer of an action and the experiencer of that action’s karmic effects.

29. The Tibetan grammar leaves it ambiguous as to whether the absence of feeling, etc., refers to enlightenment or to the outsiders. K and X indicate the former, but we have chosen the latter to avoid characterizing supreme enlightenment as a mere “nonthought,” etc., since it obviously transcends all polarities. Further, it is in keeping with the tenor of the sūtra to distinguish between enlightenment and the mere attainment of even the most advanced samādhi.

30. Tib. lan gsum bzlas pa chos kyi ’khor lo rnam mang po. Although neither Skt. nor Tib. mention the aspects as “twelve,” Lamotte supplies this from the occurrence of the formula in other sūtras, where the three revolutions correspond respectively to the paths of insight (darśana­mārga), meditation (bhāvanā­mārga), and mastery (aśaikṣa­marga), each revolution having four aspects corresponding to the Four Noble Truths. The first revolution involves recognition of each truth, the second thorough knowledge of each, and the third complete realization of each. See Lamotte, p 107, n 49; Mahāvyutpatti, nos. 1309-1324. However, since there is no mention of the “twelve aspects,” but rather “many aspects,” it is possible that what is referred to is the three doctrines of the Buddha elaborated in the Saṃdhi­nirmocana­sūtra, also known as the “Three Turnings of the Wheel of Dharma”; namely, the Disciple Vehicle teaching of the Four Noble Truths, the Mādhyamika teaching of Transcendent Wisdom, and the Vijñānavāda teaching of “Fine Discrimination Between Existence and Nonexistence” (see Lamotte’s Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra, VII, no. 30, pp 85, 206).

31. After this verse, there are two verses in K and X, not in Tib. or Skt. For verses in K, see Luk, p 7, lines 3-10, and McRae, p 73, verses 9-10; for X see Lamotte, p 108. Since X tends to be more consistent with Tib., I will translate X: “The billion-world galaxy, with its realms of gods and dragons, appears in the little parasols offered to the Lord; thus we bow to his vision, knowledge, and mass of virtues. The Lord displays the worlds to us with this miracle‍—they all are like a play of lights, as all bear witness in astonishment. Obeisance to the Lord of ten powers, endowed with knowledge and vision.”

32. Skt. āveṇika­buddha­lakṣaṇa. This and the subsequent two verses (Chap. 3) illustrate some of the special buddha-qualities, which total eighteen (see glossary “eighteen special qualities of the Buddha” for a complete list).

33. This verse in Tib. and Skt. appears to be expanded into two verses in K and X: “The Lord speaks with but one voice, but all beings, each according to his kind, gain understanding, each thinking that the Lord speaks his own language. This is a special quality of the Buddha. The Lord speaks with but one voice, but all beings, each according to his own ability, act upon it, and each derives his appropriate benefit. This is a special quality of the Buddha.” For K see Luk, p 7, and McRae, p 74. For an interesting discussion of the speech of the Buddha, see Lamotte, pp 109-110, 11. 52.

34. This and the preceding two lines ascribe to the Buddha the attainment of the three doors of liberation: voidness (śūnyatā), signlessness (animittatā), and wishlessness (apraṇihitatā).

35. Tib. byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi sangs rgyas kyi zhing yongs su dag pa; Skt. bodhi­sattvāṇam buddha­kṣetra­pari­śuddhi. Although the explanations given by the Buddha obviate the need for discussion of the meaning of this term, it is worthwhile to note that this concept is the logical corollary of the bodhisattva’s conception of enlightenment: that it be attained for the sake of all sentient beings as well as for his own sake. Thus, the bodhisattva’s quest for enlightenment does not involve merely his own development, although that is of course primary; it must also involve his cultivation of a whole “field” of living beings, those who, through karmic interconnection, have destinies intertwined with his, occupying the same worlds as he, etc. Hence, his purification of a buddhafield is a mode of expressing his ambition to cultivate a whole world or universe while he cultivates himself, so that he and his field of living beings may reach enlightenment simultaneously.

36. K and X differ here quite radically. X: “For example, sons, if one should wish to construct a palace in an unoccupied place and then adorn it, he could do so freely and without hindrance, but if he wished to build it in empty space itself, he could never succeed. In the same way, the bodhisattva, although he knows that all things are like empty space, produces pure qualities, for the development and benefit of living beings. That is the buddhafield which he embraces. To embrace a buddhafield in this way is not like building in empty space.” K: “It is as if a man wished to build a building in a vacant place‍—he could do so without difficulty. But (if he wished to do it) in empty space, he could not succeed. Likewise, the bodhisattva, in order to cultivate all living beings, wants to embrace a buddhafield. One who thus wishes to embrace a buddhafield (does not do so) in the void.” The first impulse of the translator is to resort to the Ch. versions in the interest of simplicity and ease, since the simile there is much more clearly drawn: vacant lot = living beings, empty space = any sort of materialistic notion about a buddhafield; ergo building on solid needs of living beings succeeds, and any other way fails. However, upon reflection, what does the Buddha wish to convey in this example? Are not living beings and their needs and purposes just as ultimately empty as “all things”? Would not the concretization of the benefit of living beings violate the definition of liberative technique integrated with wisdom given by Vimalakīrti himself (see 4.22)? Is it not more fitting to understand the Buddha here as telling us not to concretize any mundane aims, however beneficial, but that the bodhisattva’s great compassion must always adhere to the wisdom that sees the ephemerality of all purposive notions, constructed or constructive? When we undertake something we know to be essentially impossible, through the sheer intensity of compassion, do we not enter the realm of inconceivability? Finally, may not the Buddha be speaking in tune with his own subsequent miraculous display, as he demonstrates the actual possibility for him, no less than for space-age technology, of building a pure buddhafield in the empty space of ultimate voidness?

37. X changes the order of these four to conception, positive thought, virtuous application, and high resolve. Either order is quite acceptable, since the four work together throughout the bodhisattva’s career.

38. This phrase is taken from K (it is absent in Tib., Skt. and X) because it rounds out the list of ten virtues, being the counterpart of the sin known as “frivolous speech.” “Free of divisive intrigues and adroit in reconciling factions” basically describes one virtue, the opposite of “backbiting” (see glossary “ten sins” and “ten virtues”).

39. This step of “development…” is included in the progression by both K and X, and, since it makes more explicit the transition from liberative technique to the buddhafield itself, we have included it (although it is absent in Tib. and Skt.).

40. Śāriputra was one of the foremost disciples of the Buddha, especially renowned in Disciple Vehicle texts for his wisdom; he was called “foremost of the wise” (prajñāvatām agrya). In this sūtra, as well as in other Mahāyāna sūtras, he becomes the “fall guy” par excellence, as he is often inclined to express the Disciple Vehicle point of view, which is then roundly rejected by the Buddha, by Vimalakīrti, or by one of the bodhisattvas. In fairness to him, it is often noted that the petty thoughts that arise in his mind, for which he is severely criticized, are caused to arise there by the magical influence of the Buddha or of Vimalakīrti, so that a thought that may be entertained by numerous members of the assembly may be brought into the open and rejected. He serves therefore as an archetype of the disciple personality and need not be condemned as exceptionally obtuse personally.

41. See glossary “conception of the spirit of enlightenment.”

42. Thus, his conduct and knowledge conformed to the six transcendences.

43. Tib. ’jig rten dang ’jig rten las ’das pa’i gsang sngags dang bstan bcos; Skt. laukika­lokottara­mantra­śāstra. This is a possible reference to tantric practices, but it is missing in both K and X, who mention only “mundane practices.”

44. Vimalakīrti is here shown as the embodiment of the practice of “reconciliation of dichotomies.”

45. This sentence is absent in K and X.

46. Both K and X have, instead of this phrase, “because he taught them loyalty and filial devotion.”

47. Tib. mi rtag par is missing, but supplied by Lamotte (p 130) from the Dunhuang fragments, and also from K and X; it is supported, too, by the Sanskrit manuscript (aiśvaryānityatva­saṃ­darśanāyau).

48. These similes are famous in the Disciple Vehicle as well as Mahāyāna. The fact of their presence in Disciple Vehicle teachings was used by Prāṡangika philosophers such as Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, to prove that insubstantiality or selflessness of phenomena (dharma­nairātmyā) was taught in the Disciple Vehicle. For further references, see Lamotte, p 132, n 23.

49. According to Lamotte, the four hundred and four diseases are classified with one hundred and one arising from each of four primary elements. But according to the “eight branches” (aṣṭāṇga) of Indian and Tibetan medicine, they arise from the three humors, vāta, pitta, and kapha (vital airs, bile, and phlegm, Tib. rlung mkhris bad kan gsum), when their balance becomes disturbed: i.e., one hundred and one from airs, one hundred and one from bile, one hundred and one from phlegm, and one hundred and one from unhealthy combinations of all three.

50. Comparison of these three fundamental classifications of the psychophysical elements of a person to murderers, snakes, and an empty town is traditional. See n.102, and Lamotte, p 136, n 28.

51. Tib. has simply “born from merit and charity.” The translation here follows K. The store of merit culminates in the saṃbhogakāya, body of beatitude, and the store of wisdom culminates in the dharmakāya, ultimate body.

52. Skt. śīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti, and vimukti­jñāna­darśana are the five Dharma-aggregates, or pure aggregates, or members of the Dharma-body of the Buddha (see Lamotte, p 139, n 30).

53. These are the two main types of Mahāyāna meditation. The former corresponds to the fifth transcendence and includes all practices that cultivate one-pointedness of mind; the latter corresponds to the sixth transcendence, especially the analytic penetration to the realization of personal selflessness (pudgala­nairātmya) and phenomenal selflessness (dharma­nairātmya), or voidness. The latter is not so well known as the former, which is commonly considered to be the main type of meditation: nondiscursive, one-pointed, etc. Nevertheless, it is said frequently in both sūtras and commentaries that without integrated practice of both, the higher stages of enlightenment will not be attained. For more details, see glossary (under “mental quiescence” and “transcendental analysis”).

54. Degé has dben pa, isolation, but most of the other Kangyurs (including the Stok Palace) have bden pa, truth, and this is confirmed by the Sanskrit, satya.

55. Skt. utsāhate. This has been translated most frequently in its meaning of “fitness, capacity,” as each of the monks and bodhisattvas asked by the Buddha to visit Vimalakīrti replies with the same phrase: “I am not fit…” or “I am not able…” However, from the Tibetan use of the word spro ba, which means to be enthusiastic, inspired, gladdened, I chose to interpret this in its meaning of enthusiasm, which in the negative gives “I am not enthusiastic…” or “I am reluctant….” That is, none of those asked by the Buddha are actually pretending to be unable to visit Vimalakīrti; they only plead their unwillingness, timidity, etc., in order to be excused by the Buddha from carrying out his command.

56. Vimalakīrti confounds Śāriputra by demanding of him the ability to reconcile dichotomies in actual practice, i.e., by rejecting Śāriputra’s Disciple Vehicle position and expecting him to follow the way of the bodhisattva. Śāriputra reacts in the same way as the other monks and bodhisattvas in this chapter: he is overwhelmed and speechless, yet intuitively recognizes the rightness of Vimalakīrti’s statements. He can neither accept them and put them into practice nor reject them outright (see Lamotte, p 142, n 3).

57. Maudgalyāyana was known as the “foremost of those endowed with miraculous powers” (ṛddhimatāṃ agrya) and was paired with Śāriputra as one of the two leading disciples of the Buddha. Vimalakīrti chastises him basically for failing to use his “wisdom eye,” his superknowledge of what is in others’ minds (para­citta­jñāna), to determine that his listeners were willing and able to learn and understand the Mahāyāna teaching of the profound nature of reality, and for teaching them instead the Disciple Vehicle teaching, with its one-sided emphasis on world-rejection, etc.

58. Tib. rlabs thams cad dang bral ba; Skt. sarvormivigata, lit. “free of all waves” (of thought).

59. Skt. dharmadhātu. This is not the dharma­dhātu (phenomenal element) included among the eighteen elements (see glossary). It is one of the five synonyms of voidness included in Maitreya’s Madhyānta­vibhāga, I, 15‍—tathatā bhūtakoṭiśca ’nimittaṃ paramārthatā | dharma­dhātuśca paryāyāḥ śūnyatāyāḥ samāsataḥ ||‍—where it is analyzed in a rather unusual way as “the element of Dharma, from which arise the noble qualities of the arhats….” However, Tib. dbyings definitely indicates interpretation of dhātu as space, realm, etc., rather than element; so, with the proviso that it is a synonym of voidness, it is here translated “ultimate realm” (i.e., no relative realm at all). See glossary, “ultimate realm.”

60. This passage follows X quite closely, but K is somewhat different in details (see Luk, pp 21-22, or McRae, p 86).

61. This refers to those teachings (of śūnyatā, etc.) the Buddha reserves for disciples of greatest ability, definitive teachings (nītārtha­vacana) as opposed to teaching meant to develop disciples (to the point when they can understand the definitive teachings), which are known as interpretable teachings (neyārtha­vacana). See glossary, “definitive meaning.”

62. Mahākāśyapa was known as “the foremost among the upholders of the ascetic practices” (dhūta­guṇa­vādinām agraḥ) and was the Buddha’s successor as leader of the saṅgha after the parinirvāṇa. Here he is engaged in one of the twelve ascetic practices (see glossary), that of living on food begged as alms (paiṇḍapātika). Thus, in the very execution of his specialty he is scolded by Vimalakīrti, who points out to him that such practices are intrinsically worthless and are useful only if combined with the true equanimity reached through the wisdom that realizes voidness.

63. Kāśyapa is favoring the poor here by depriving the rich of the chance to give food to him and thus benefit themselves.

64. Skt. yo ’svabhāvo ’para­bhāvaś ca tad anujjvalitam | yad anujjvalitaṃ tan na śāmyati. His seemingly irrelevant statement, which occurs again in Vimala­kīrti’s speech to Kātyāyana (3.25), is, in fact, highly relevant to the main Disciple Vehicle concern: the burning of the misery of the world, in which, they believe, man’s condition is like that of one whose head is ablaze. Hence their major preoccupation is to extinguish that fire, just as a burning man will seek water with a frantic intensity to save himself. Thus Vimala­kīrti is telling Mahā­kāśyapa and Kātyāyana that since they do not have intrinsic existence as self, or imparted existence as other in relationship to anything else, they do not really exist and, therefore, they cannot burn with the misery of the world and there is nothing to extinguish in liberation (nirvāṇa literally meaning “extinguishment”).

65. Among Subhūti’s other strong points, he was known as the “foremost among those worthy of offerings,” (dakṣiṇeyānāṃ agraḥ, see Lamotte, p 154, n 27). Thus Vimalakīrti challenges him precisely about his worthiness, defining it by testing Subhūti’s equanimity in the face of all the most unworthy things he can think of and causing Subhūti to feel frightened and confused by his own adherence to dualities such as good and evil.

66. By “fruition,” Vimalakīrti means any of the culminating stages of realization attained by those who practice the teachings, such as the Four Noble Truths, the twofold selflessness, etc.

67. Tib.: chos thams cad dang yang ldan la chos thams cad kyi ’du shes dang yang bral. The Skt. of the Potala MS reads na sarva­dharma­samanvāgataś ca sarva­dharma­samadhigataś ca, but to accord with the Tib., which seems clearer and was presumably translated from a different MS, this would have to be emended to read sarva­dharma­samanvāgataś ca na sarva­dharma­saṃjñāvigataś ca.

68. Tib. nyon mongs pa med pa (lit. “absence of passions,” or afflictions). However, the Skt. here is araṇa, and K and X use “nondisputation,” which is actually equivalent to dispassion, since the “struggle,” or “disputation,” referred to is internal, the turbulence of inner struggle of one prey to passions. This is perhaps more appropriate here, since Subhūti was renowned for his attainment of this state (see Lamotte, p 154, n 27; araṇa­vihārīnām agro, etc.)

69. K and X: “if those who make offerings to you do not find in you a field of merit.”

70. According to the Mahāyāna understanding of the miraculous nature of the three bodies of the Buddha, especially the “incarnation-body” (nirmāṇakāya), Vimalakīrti himself is an extremely likely candidate to be one of its operatives. Thus, one steeped in the Mahāyāna faith would see him here as being subtly playful with Subhūti.

71. Tib. yi ge de dag thams cad ni yi ge med pa ste/ rnam par grol ba ni ma gtogs so/ chos thams cad ni rnam par grol ba’i mtshan nyid do. K and X differ slightly, but essentially have the same meaning: “Language does not have an independent nature. When it is no more, there is liberation.” In other words, no independent nature = ultimately nonexistent; it is no more = when the ultimate is realized; then liberation = when even words are realized to be liberation, there is no more duality, and there is realization. Ch. stresses the experiential moment of pure gnosis of voidness. Tib. expresses this gnosis along with its nondual, postattainment wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha­jñāna). It is Vimalakīrti’s last word on nonduality to instruct Subhūti.

72. Pūrṇa, “son of Maitrāyaṇī,” was known as “the foremost of expounders of the Dharma” (dharma­kathikānām agraḥ; see Lamotte, p 160, n 42). According to the Pāli sources (as cited by Lamotte), this very incident, or one similar to it, resulted in five hundred young monks’ attainment of the state of arhat. In any case, it can be assumed that Pūrṇa was often entrusted with the instruction of young monks, and it was just such an occasion on which Vimalakīrti apprehended him. His reproaches are along the same line as those given to Maudgalyāyana, only more explicit, i.e., that the great disciples should not teach the Dharma because they cannot recognize the affinity for the Mahāyāna in their pupils.

73. This means they attained the eighth bodhisattva stage, called “The Immovable,” where the bodhisattva becomes irreversible (avaivartika) and previous to which he is liable to regression, even to forgetting the spirit of enlightenment already conceived in former lifetimes, as in the case of these monks.

74. Kātyāyana was renowned as the founder of the Abhidharma tradition of analysis of the meaning of the Buddha’s discourses. He was pronounced by the Buddha, according to the Pāli sources, to be the “foremost expounder of the detailed meaning of the concise declarations (of the Buddha)” (aggo saṅkhittena bhāsitassa vitthārena attham vibhajantānam). True to form, Vimalakīrti finds him when he is engaged in the execution of his special expertise (see Lamotte, p 162, n 49 and glossary).

75. These four are called the “four insignia of the Dharma” or “four epitomes” (see glossary).

76. K and X insert: “That all things do not exist ultimately is the meaning of voidness.”

77. See n.64.

78. Aniruddha was said to be “foremost among possessors of the divine eye” (agro divya­cakṣukānām; see Lamotte, p 167, n 56, and glossary).

79. This dilemma was more embarrassing to Aniruddha than confounding, since logically he could have answered that of course his divine eye was compounded, just like that of outsider adepts. Vimalakīrti touched his pride in this critique; hence the dilemma he poses here bears only superficial resemblance to the Mādhyamika dialectic.

80. Upāli was especially well known as expert in Vinaya, the code of monastic discipline, and was its chief compiler after the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa (vināya­dharāṇām agraḥ).

81. Tib. the tsom sol te bdag cag gnyis ltung ba las phyung shig (lit. “remove our doubts and take us both out from the infraction”). The “absolution” consists in the senior monk’s listening to their confession and encouraging their resolution not to repeat the infraction. Thus he grants no dispensations in regard to the retributive effects and only gives them the opportunity to come to a new understanding and decision in their own minds. This is traditional in Buddhist discipline.

82. Skt. vināyadhara. As usual, Vimalakīrti makes his point on the disciple’s home ground: Upāli was known as vināya­dharāṇāṃ agraḥ, “foremost upholder of the discipline,” as the two monks mention in the next paragraph.

83. Rāhula was the actual son of the Buddha and was admired in the saṅgha as a renunciant and devotee because he forsook the throne to join the saṅgha under his father. The Pāli sources show him dubbed “foremost among those eager for training” (Skt. śikṣākāmānam agro; see Lamotte, p 177, n 70).

84. Tib. thog ma’i dang tha’ ma’i mthar lta ba dang bral ba’o. K and X have instead: “Renunciation is beyond this, that, and in between, being above the sixty-two false views.” The Skt. does not appear to include this sentence.

85. Some verses of Tsong Khapa summarize the Mahāyāna “mind of renunciation” very aptly: “Reverse the interest in this life by thinking over again and again that leisure and opportunity (to practice the Dharma) are hard to find and that there is no (fixed) duration of life. Reverse interest in the life hereafter by constantly meditating upon the inexorability of karma and the sufferings of the world. Through such concentration, when there is not the slightest ambition, even for a split second, for even the greatest successes in the world, the mind of renunciation has arisen.” See G. Wangyal, Door of Liberation (New York, Girodias, 1973), Chap. V.

86. Even after his explanation, the young men still confuse renunciation, a mental concentration, with the mundane act of entering the monkhood. So Vimalakīrti has to remind them that the conception of the spirit‌ of enlightenment‌ is the true renunciation, not just a mere change of clothes and habits.

87. Tib. and Skt. have thirty-two hundred, but K and X have thirty-two, which seems more reasonable.

88. Ānanda was renowned for many things: learning, mindfulness, steadfastness, etc., and was the second leader of the saṅgha , after Mahākāśyapa. Vimalakīrti finds fault with him when he is being “foremost of attendants” (aggo upaṭṭhākānām), caring for the Buddha’s apparent needs as he did faithfully for twenty-five years.

89. See Lamotte, p 183, n 77, for learned references to this incident in other sources, notably Vatsasūtra.

90. Tib. gzhan mu stegs can spyod pa pa dang kun tu rgyu dang gcer bu pa dang tsho ba pa dag; Skt. anyatīrthika caraka parivrajaka nigranthājīvāḥ. I have simply rendered this “outsider sectarians” so as not to burden the reader with irrelevant names, as this expression is a cliché for all the outsider groups occurring in other Mahāyāna sūtras (see Lamotte, p 186, n 81).

91. Voices from sky-gods are common in Mahāyāna sūtras.

92. See Lamotte, p 186, n 82, for another version of this episode translated by Kumārajīva in Prajñā­pāramitopadeśa.

93. K and X start a new chapter at this point, while Tib. and Skt. include the disciples’ and bodhisattvas’ responses to the Buddha’s request in a single chapter.

94. The characterization of Maitreya in Mahāyāna sūtras is that of having a certain naiveté. Mañjusrī often chides him, and Vimalakīrti does not let him rest on his laurels.

95. K and X give a different reading: “How then, Maitreya, did you receive the prophecy of your attainment of buddhahood after only one more birth? Did you receive it as the reality of birth or as the reality of death? In the former case, this reality is uncreated, and in the latter case, it does not die.” As always, Ch. is less abstract than Tib., but both agree on the general tenor of Vimalakīrti’s refutation of Maitreya’s acceptance of the prophecy as being valid on the ultimate level of reality (paramārtha­satyatā). On the question of the validity of prophecies on the superficial and ultimate levels, see Lamotte, p 189, n 89.

96. The thrust of Vimalakīrti’s instruction here is that “being enlightened” and “being unenlightened” are valid designations only on the superficial, designative, relative level of truth. “Discriminative construction” is that mental process that seeks to “absolutize” a relative thing, taking “ignorance” and “enlightenment” as ultimately real things. Thus in all the subsequent negational descriptions of enlightenment, the phrase “on the ultimate level” may be understood to avert a nihilistic interpretation. See Introduction, i.1 ff.

97. Tib. rnam par rig pa med pa; Skt. avijñapti (lit. “without means of cognition”). Again, it may be stressed that all these statements imply the qualification “ultimately” (paramārthena).

98. K and X: “It is the seat of interdependent origination, because it is like infinite space.” Ch. thus takes pratītya­samutpāda (see glossary “dependent origination” and “relativity”) as equivalent to śūnyatā, which is correct as regards its ultimate nature. Vimalakīrti refers to the “cessation-order” of the twelve links of origination: that is, stopping ignorance stops synthetic activity; stopping synthetic activity stops consciousness; stopping consciousness stops name-and-form; stopping name-and-form stops the six sense-media; stopping the sense-media stops contact; stopping contact stops sensation; stopping sensation stops craving; stopping craving stops grasping; stopping grasping stops existence; stopping existence stops birth; and stopping birth stops old age and death. This is the sequence of realization of the twelvefold chain during the attainment of enlightenment on the seat of enlightenment‌.

99. Tib. dam pa’i chos yongs su ’dzin pa; Skt. saddharma­saṃgraha. Here taken as “incorporation” in the sense of the bodhisattva’s incorporation of the holy Dharma in all phases of his daily life.

100. Tib. sha kya’i sras; Skt. Śākya­putrīya. This implies that Jagatindhara, although a layman, has religious vows of celibacy in the bodhisattva order of Śākyamuni.

101. Here Vimalakīrti is shown as an emanation of the Buddha, who encountered these same goddesses as temptresses during his night under the bodhi tree, where he subdued them. Here, Vimalakīrti not only subdues them but goes a step further and causes them to conceive the spirit of enlightenment.

102. See n.50. The aggregates murder the spirit of enlightenment‌ when falsely considered as “I” and “mine” through egoistic views. The elements, when egoistically misapprehended as constituting an experiencing subject, its objects, and its perceptions, poison the health of liberation. And the sense-media are like an empty town, as there is no person living within them.

103. It is commonly observed by the Buddha and all the great Buddhist philosophers, such as Nāgārjuna, that many feel frightened when taught the profound teaching of voidness because of misapprehensions about that most healing of concepts.

104. Tib. drin gzo ba, or byas pa gzo ba; Skt. kṛtajñaḥ. This is one of the important themes of the meditation of the spirit of enlightenment‌, of love and compassion. The kind deeds of the Tathāgata consist in his appearance in the world in order to save living beings, as a kind mother will even sacrifice her life for her beloved child. This kindness is repaid by generating the same compassion for all other living beings and conceiving the spirit‌ of enlightenment‌.

105. Sudatta (legs par byin) is more commonly called Anātha­piṇḍada (mgon med zas sbyin); he was a great philanthropist of Śrāvastī, known as “the foremost of donors” (Pāli aggo dāyakānaṃ). For numerous references see Lamotte, p 211, n 135.

106. Skt. mahāyajña. The great sacrifice was an ancient Indian custom which, in Vedic times, was the central ritual of the Brahmanic religion. It usually consisted of sacrifices to the gods of various material things. By the Buddha’s time, it was not uncommon for such an occasion to become rather a formalized period of donation to priests, ascetics, and beggars. However, the Buddha commonly declared that sacrifice and the giving of material things was infinitely less meritorious than sacrifice of egoism and the giving of the Dharma. This is the tenor of Vimalakīrti’s critique.

107. Last phrase incorporated from K and X.

108. Last phrase incorporated from K and X.

109. This accords with the “Joy Immeasurable, which realizes the ultimate liberation of all beings from the beginningless,” the standard description of the third of the “four immeasurables.” See glossary.

110. X follows Tib., but K has “of realizing firmness of body, life, and wealth, consummated in the three indestructibles.” The three indestructibles are infinite body, endless life, and boundless wealth (see Luk, p 46, n 3), but this concept is apparently not found in Skt. or in Tib. Nevertheless, Tib. has the same meaning because the “body, health, and wealth” here referred to are not mundane in nature, but refer to the true body, etc., of the Buddha. See 2.10.

111. In a later work, this would be taken as an obvious reference to tantric yoga, but here, this yoga might also be interpreted as a reference to the highest yoga of the bodhisattva, the yoga of the inconceivable liberation. See Chapter 5.

112. Sudatta here misses the point, apparently, and, instead of awakening to the transvaluation of the notion of sacrifice, he again resorts to a material sacrifice. Thus, Vimalakīrti has to go beyond his previous statements and stage the following miracle to make his point.

113. This extremely terse and subtle dialogue must be translated with the greatest grammatical precision to avoid confusion in meaning. It is all too tempting to translate the instrumental case (Ch. yii, Tib. kyis) as genitive, rendering the phrase “empty by means of emptiness” (stong pa nyid kyis stong pa) as “empty of emptiness,” which then can be identified as the well-known voidness of voidness (śūnyatā­śūnyatā). Vimalakīrti says here only that the buddhafields are empty because that is their ultimate nature, not that they are equivalent to the emptiness of emptiness.

114. Mañjuśrī implies that Vimalakīrti is negating the validity of the superficial reality (saṃvṛti­satya), since, granted that the ultimate nature is emptiness, does that mean that any particular superficial thing, such as a buddhafield, is empty, even as a relative thing?

115. Vimalakīrti ignores the implication and repeats his statement of the ultimate reality of all things, mentioning specifically mental constructions (parikalpa) in place of buddhafields.

116. Then Mañjuśrī challenges Vimalakīrti’s use of the ultimate nature of emptiness, probing to see if Vimalakīrti might be hypostatizing emptiness as something, which could be constructed mentally or conceptualized.

117. Vimalakīrti rejects that possibility, finally introducing the concept of “emptiness of emptiness,” i.e., that emptiness is itself but a conceptual construction and, as such, is itself empty of substantial, ultimate reality.

118. K: “Sickness is neither of the element earth, nor separate from it; and the same pertains to the other elements. Sicknesses of living beings arise from the four primary elements, and I am sick because of their sicknesses.”

119. Tib.: nyes bar spyod pa thams cad bstan pa ste/ ’pho bas ni ma yin no. K and X: “…But not to consider that they have entered into the past.” Tib. ’pho ba can mean either “transmigration at death,” or “transference,” such as the transference of sin to another, who absolves the sinner with his blessing. This is not practiced in Buddhism, as no absolution is effective: karmic effects cannot be avoided in any case, and the important thing is to cultivate the states of mind that refrain from wrongdoing.

120. The two thought processes here outlined follow the pattern of the meditation of the two selflessnesses, personal and phenomenal or of things (pudgala­nairātmya and dharma­nairātmya). In short Vimalakīrti is equating sickness with the bodhisattva’s very existence in the world, and the cure he prescribes is the cure for all misery in the world.

121. The concluding phrase on the voidness of voidness is not in Skt. or Tib. but is incorporated from K. Note the central Mādhyamika thesis that all things exist conventionally as “mere designations” (prajñapti­mātra).

122. This phrase is not in Skt. or Tib. but is incorporated from K and X. Other slight differences between Ch. and Tib. in these passages do not alter the essential meaning.

123. In perceiving objects, we unconsciously assent to their apparent, self-sufficient, ultimate existence and thereby are confirmed in our innate phenomenal egoism. The only antidote for this deepest root of saṃsāric life is the subtle awareness of voidness.

124. Skt. anupalambha. About this important method, Bhāva­viveka has this to say (Tarkajvāla, IV.23): “In order to abandon adherence to materialism, one should condition oneself to the cultivation of nonperception. So doing, even a single instant of the undistorted, spontaneous realization of the reality of all things will eliminate the stream of passions with their instinctual drives, these instincts being the cohesive force in objective appearance. Thus, when no objects are perceived, there is no occasion for the arising of instinct. This is the method of the Mahāyāna.”

125. This analogy explaining the word “bodhisattva” is strong evidence for the fact that “sattva” here has its meaning of “hero” or “warrior,” rather than merely its meaning of “living being.” This puts the Tib. byang chub sems dpa’, “enlightenment-mind-hero,” in a favorable light.

126. Skt. *anunaya­dṛṣṭi­karunā (lit. “compassion of emotional conviction”). The available Skt. reads anuśaṃsā­dṛṣṭi, but the Tibetan was clearly translated from another MS that must have read anunaya­dṛśṭi­karuṇā. This is false compassion, according to Candrakīrti, as it is not integrated with the wisdom of impermanence, hence not effective in actually alleviating the sufferings of living beings. Candrakīrti (Madhyamakāvatāra, I) enumerates three levels of true great compassion, compassion that sees beings, that sees things, and non-objectifying, respectively, combined with the wisdoms of impermanence, of personal selflessness, and of phenomenal selflessness. See glossary “great compassion.”

127. “Reincarnation” is here used in the sense of “voluntary rebirth” to distinguish the coming into the world of a bodhisattva as opposed to the birth of a normal being.

128. The integration of wisdom and liberative art (prajñopāyādvaya) is the fundamental formulation of the Mahāyāna path. It is the main dichotomy reconciliation the bodhisattva must incorporate in his practice. It is carried over into the symbolism of the tantra, where wisdom = bell = female and technique = vajra = male. Thus this integration finds its most exalted symbol in the tantric representation of the Buddha as male and female in union.

129. K and X have one more domain here, “wherein practice is neither pure nor impure.”

130. K has “transcendent knowledge”; but that would not be paradoxical, in keeping with the general pattern of this description, whereas “transcendence” conveys the idea of the bodhisattva accomplishing the transcendences for other living beings as well as for himself.

131. The “knowledge of exhaustion of defilements” is one of the five or six (see glossary “superknowledges”); hence the paradox.

132. K supplies the location here.

133. K has “The domain of the holy eightfold path, where one delights in the unlimited path of the Buddha…” The preceding statements concerning the four foci of mindulness, the four right efforts, the four bases of magical powers, the five spiritual faculties, the five powers, the seven factors of enlightenment, and the eightfold noble path (from K) are the practices known as the “thirty-seven aids to enlightenment.”

134. A critique of those who interpret the four noble truths dualistically.

135. That is, production of nirvāṇa and destruction of defilements.

136. This concludes Vimalakīrti’s definition of the “religion” of Buddhism in its true sense. Any personal interest (i.e., selfish interest) in anything, even “Dharma,” “nirvāṇa,” etc., is nonetheless a selfish interest, and the Dharma obtains only in the absence of selfish interest.

137. That is, through his miraculous power of teleportation.

138. This enthronement of the audience for a religious discourse is most remarkable in the light of Buddhist tradition, where there is an explicit interdiction against teaching the Dharma to anyone who is seated even a few inches higher than the teacher. It is another instance of a tantric tinge, as the initiate is symbolically enthroned by the preceptor to receive the consecrations.

139. The “inconceivable liberation” is said later (5.19) to be only a fragment of an inconceivably great teaching. As Lamotte points out (p 250, n 11), this probably refers to the teaching of the Avataṃsaka, which is also known as Acintya­vimokṣa­sūtra. This highlights the uniqueness of Vimalakīrti, who encompasses quintessentially the major doctrines of both Prajñā­pāramitā and Avataṃsaka, the former emphasizing wisdom and the latter, liberative art.

140. These deities abide, respectively, on the four sides of Sumeru and on the summit.

141. A reminder that all these miraculous feats are only for the purpose of disciplining living beings. Similarly, only those hearers who are imaginatively sensitive to the extraordinary warp of dimensional distortion set up by Vimalakīrti will understand the inconceivable weave of his instruction in the inconceivable liberation.

142. K is more brief here, giving essentially the second of the three sentences in this paragraph. He is as explicit as Tib.

143. There is little doubt that this refers to the same teaching given in the Avataṃsaka. It is, however, highly questionable whether it mentions any particular text, as Tib. bstan pa (Skt. nirdeśa) is “teaching” rather than a “text,” as in Vimala­kīrti­nirdeśa (teaching of Vimalakīrti).

144. Kāśyapa brings up an interesting point: from the Mahāyāna viewpoint the arhats of the Individual Vehicle are less fortunate than even the beginner bodhisattvas because, having eliminated their personal suffering, they cannot easily empathize with other living beings and hence find it hard to be inspired with great compassion. This makes their progress from arhat to full buddhahood much slower than that of the bodhisattva. This loss of opportunity occasions the “cry of regret.”

145. Although Vimalakīrti might seem to be relentless in thus demolishing Mahā­kāśyapa’s notion of evil (his rigid dualism that holds Māra as the opposite of liberation and virtue), just as the great disciple was filled with despair at his own sense of inadequacy before the teaching of inconceivability, Vimala­kīrti actually is encouraging him. Things, even māras, are not what they seem, and if Māra can be a bodhisattva, then possibly a great disciple might attain to the Mahāyāna more easily than his habitual notions might allow him to think.

146. This is the definition of the highest type of compassion: “non-objectifying great compassion” (anupalambha­mahā­karuṇā). Thus such compassion is pure sensitivity, with no cognitive grasp on any person or thing as the identifiable object of its powerful feeling (see glossary, “great compassion”).

147. Mañjuśrī voices the pressing question about the great love and compassion of the bodhisattva: seeing living beings as nonexistent, how can he feel love and compassion for them? As Vimalakīrti indicates, the bodhisattva’s love is not merely commiseration but a spontaneous overflow of his great joy and relief in realizing the radiant nature of reality. Although he grasps no living being, he, being empty of himself, is utterly sensitive to the oppressive gravity of the “living being” feeling of others, and his love is an outpouring of his awareness of their true nature.

148. The folk etymology of arhat is arīnāṃ hantṛ‍—“killer of enemies” (passions and ignorance).

149. K: “…because it is causeless.”

150. K and X: “…because it is always opportune.”

151. K and X: “It is the rendering of blessings without expectation of return.”

152. That is, the protection of the Buddha is found, not in mere dependence on him, but in self-reliant cultivation of one’s own positive mind.

153. This famous dialogue is quoted in the Śikṣā­samuccaya, pp 80, 81. Śāntideva introduces the quote by the following remark: “If the superficial reality is baseless, how can it be either valid or invalid? (Its validity is comparable to) the illusion of a man (which can arise) even without a post being there (to be misperceived). And furthermore, where is the advocate of voidness who admits the ultimate existence of a post that would serve as basis of the false perception of a man? Thus, all things are rootless, their root not being established in reality.”

154. Monks are not allowed to wear garlands or perfumes, etc.

155. Since the bodhisattvas have purged their sub­conscious­nesses of the instinctual roots of emotional habit-patterns, they do not fear the surface manifestations of passions inevitable in worldly life because these cannot affect them deeply.

156. K: “Liberation is neither within nor without, nor in between.”

157. Here Śāriputra’s silence fails where Vimalakīrti’s famous silence on the subject of nonduality succeeds (see n.184). Thus silence per se is not necessarily reflective of highest wisdom.

158. The Individual Vehicle followers, from the bodhisattva point of view.

159. For numerous references concerning the Mahāyāna doctrine of the “unique vehicle” (ekayāna), most explicitly stated in the Lotus Sūtra, see Lamotte, p 275, n 32.

160. According to Lamotte (p 278, n 34), this refers to four famous treasures, each guarded by a great nāga-king; by Pińgala at Kaliṅga, Pāṇḍuka at Mithila, Elapātra at Gandhāra, and Śankho at Kāśi (Benares).

161. Skt. has siṃha­nādanādī; Tib. has seng ge bsgrags pa, which would suggest “Siṃhakīrti.”

162. Lamotte (p 220, n 3; p 280, n 36) follows K and his commentators in identifying this “Dharma-door” with the sūtra called The Secrets of the Realized Ones (Tathāgātācintya­guhya­nirdeśa, Toh 47). However, it does not seem quite certain that so many tathāgatas would be required to expound the same text. Rather, it seems that this assembly of tathāgatas refers to the formation of a cosmic maṇḍala, such as is formed in the first chapter of Guhya­samāja­tantra, and the “secrets of the tathāgatas” would then be the general name for any sort of tantric teaching. This would bear out the description of Vimalakīrti as understanding “the mundane and transcendental sciences and esoteric practices” (p 21) and (by Mañjuśrī) as penetrating “all the esoteric mysteries of the bodhisattvas and the buddhas” (p 42). This evidence can have been overlooked by scholars of great erudition only because of their firm conviction that tantrism did not exist in India at the time of Vimalakīrti, or even of that sūtra. Scholars native to the Buddhist tradition would disagree.

163. Śāriputra evidences his belief that enlightenment can be obtained only by men, and that women must first reincarnate in male form to reach the highest goal. Thus he cannot understand why the goddess would not use her power to become a man.

164. This whole incident is quite similar to an exchange that takes place between Śāriputra and the daughter of Sāgara, the nāga-king, in the Lotus Sūtra (pp 250-254). For an interesting discussion of the prejudice against females in Buddhism in general and of the Mādhyamika negation of this prejudice as executed, for example, by the goddess, see Lamotte, p 280, n 37.

165. That is, the miraculous Mahāyāna.

166. That is, the jewel of the spirit of enlightenment.

167. This translation follows K and X, as Tib., “He follows the ways of the elements and the sense-media, yet…” is obscure.

168. The disciples are bereft of the emotional patterns related to inspiration, aspiration, etc., which are necessary to form an intense high resolve to attain anything. The bodhisattva does not catch up with them in wisdom until he reaches the eighth stage (acalā), the “immovable”; hence he retains the emotional structure necessary for cultivation of great compassion until that high stage.

169. See notes n.7 and n.128.

170. K: “With the undefiled qualities as trees.”

171. Tib. and Skt. have only “Covered with pure lotuses.” K gives “seven purities”: purity of (1) body and voice, or morality, (2) mind, (3) self-control, or vision, (4) resolution of doubts, (5) discernment of paths, (6) knowledge and insight into bondage, and (7) nirvāṇa. See Lamotte, p 294, n 26.

172. Following K and X.

173. Following K and X.

174. K and X: “Although he knows that the buddhafields are void like living beings, he practices purification of buddhafields to teach and civilize those living beings.”

175. The three periods of time mentioned in this and the two preceding stanzas are part of the Buddhist scheme of the evolution and devolution of the world. A great eon (mahā­kalpa) contains four eons (kalpa). Each of the four eons contains twenty intermediate eons (antara­kalpa). Our world lasts for twenty of these intermediate eons. At the end of each intermediate eon, except for the first and the twentieth, three periods of time occur during which various disasters befall the human beings of that period. The first, the time of swords, lasts seven days, and men go crazy and murder each other. The second, the time of sickness, lasts seven months and seven days, and human beings are stricken with plagues. The third lasts seven years, seven months, and seven days; there is drought and extreme misery of starvation. (See Abhi­dharma­kośa III, p 207; Lamotte, p 296, n 37.)

176. Skt. agnimadhye yathā padmaṃ abhūtaṃ taṃ vinirdiśet | evaṃ kāmāmś ca dhyānaṃ ca abhūtaṃ te vidarśayī (from Śikṣā­samuccaya); agni­madhye yathā padmam adbhutaṃ pi vidarśayet | evaṃ kāmāṃś ca dhyānaṃ ca adbhutaṃ te vidarśayi (from Potala MS). The Ch. variant here (McRae, 2004: “For a lotus flower to be born in the midst of fire / Can certainly be called rare! / To practice dhyāna within the desires‍—/ This is just as rare”) is unsupported by the Skt.

177. “Nonduality” (advayatva) = “Middle Path” (madhyama­pratipat) = freedom from extremes of being and nothingness (antadvaya­vivarjita). For numerous references, see Lamotte, pp 301-302, n 1.

178. Skt. yan nopādadāti tan nopalabhate, tatrohāpohaṃ na karoti. These two correspond to “realism” and “nihilism,” respectively, in the system of the Saṃdhi­nirmocana Sūtra, the basis of Āryāsaṅga’s elaboration of the “mind-only” philosophy. In terms of the “three-nature” (trilakṣana) theory, realism involves confusion of the conceptually constructed with the relative, and nihilism involves repudiation of all three natures through repudiation of the relative along with the conceptually constructed.

179. Small differences in K and X do not affect the meaning. “Unique­ness” corresponds to realism, the idea that each thing has its special character as a fixed essence. “Character­less­ness” corresponds to nihilism.

180. K and X differ: “ ‘Creation’ (Skt. saṃskṛta; Ch. 有為 ) and ‘noncreation’ (Skt. asaṃskṛta; Ch. 無為 ) are dualistic…,” etc. (The rest is parallel.) Actually, what is saṃskṛta is miserable, and what is asaṃskṛta is nirvāṇa, i.e., happiness. Thus this difference is not significant.

181. X: “ ‘Destructible’ and ‘indestructible’ are dualistic. Knowing there to be nothing destroyed or undestroyed, the bodhisattva calls ‘destructible’ what is utterly destroyed. Utterly destroyed, it is not to be destroyed. The destruction is instantaneous, yet there is no production or destruction in an instant, so it is actually indestructible. There being no ‘destruction’ in reality, there is no ‘indestructibility.’ To realize their voidness by nature is the entrance….” K is more brief, but essentially in agreement. It should be remembered here that “destructible” = the relative, and “indestructible” = the absolute. Thus, Pratyakṣa­darśa is affirming that the superficial is the ultimate, etc. See 10.20-10.23.

182. K: “The four elements and the void are twain. But the nature of the four elements is the nature of the void. The past and the future are void, thus the present is also void. To know the nature of the elements in this way is to enter….”

183. One of the synonyms of voidness is “truthlessness,” (Tib. bden par med pa), truth being a relative validity and the ultimate being beyond truth and falsehood. Last two sentences follow X.