The Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Lines

Then the Blessed One addressed the venerable Subhūti: “Subhūti, commencing with the perfection of wisdom, be inspired to give a Dharma discourse to bodhisattva great beings on how bodhisattva great beings will go forth in the perfection of wisdom!”

Thereupon, those bodhisattva great beings, those great śrāvakas, and those gods who were present thought, “Will the venerable Subhūti reveal the perfection of wisdom to these bodhisattva great beings through the strong and mighty armor of his own wisdom and inspired eloquence, or will he reveal it through the power of the buddhas?”

Then, through the power of the buddhas, the venerable Subhūti comprehended in his mind the thoughts of those bodhisattva great beings, those śrāvakas, and those gods, and said to the venerable Śāradvatīputra, “Venerable Śāradvatīputra, whatever the śrāvakas of the Blessed One say, whatever they teach, and whatever they expound, it is all through the power of the Tathāgata. None of the doctrines that the Tathāgata has taught contradict the nature of reality. It is in this way that those children of good family are training in that Dharma teaching and also actualizing such a nature of reality. Śāradvatīputra, it is just the Tathāgata who, through skillful means, will teach the perfection of wisdom to bodhisattva great beings. Venerable Śāradvatīputra, this teaching of the perfection of wisdom for bodhisattva great beings is not within the capacity of any śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas.”

The venerable Subhūti then asked the Blessed One, “Blessed Lord, you have spoken of ‘bodhisattvas, bodhisattvas,’ yet what is it that has the designation bodhisattva or perfection of wisdom? Blessed Lord, I do not observe any such ‘bodhisattva’ or ‘perfection of wisdom’ at all.

“Blessed Lord, since I do not observe those bodhisattva great beings, or that perfection of wisdom, or even that name ‘bodhisattva,’ which bodhisattva great beings should I teach and instruct, and in which perfection of wisdom?”

The Blessed One replied to the venerable Subhūti, “Subhūti, those‍—namely, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term bodhisattva‍—are all mere names. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘being, being,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘self, self,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘life form, life form,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘living being, living being,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘life, life,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘individual, individual,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘person, person,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘one born of Manu, one born of Manu,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘a child of Manu, a child of Manu,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘agent, agent,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘instigator, instigator,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘motivator, motivator,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘inciter, inciter,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘experiencer, experiencer,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘instigator of an experiencer, instigator of an experiencer,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘knower, knower,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: that name that is the designation when you say ‘viewer, viewer,’ for instance, is a name that is merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, in the same way, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term bodhisattva are all merely designated. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name or conventional term, anything that has been designated neither arises nor ceases. These names neither exist internally nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: the term inner physical forms, for instance, is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, a designation for something neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: the term inner feelings, for instance, is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, a designation for something neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: the term inner perceptions, for instance, is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, a designation for something neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: the term inner formative predispositions, for instance, is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, a designation for something neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: the term inner consciousness, for instance, is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, a designation for something neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, in the same way, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, the term bodhisattva, and all those phenomena are simply mere designations for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, a designation for something neither arises nor ceases. These names do not exist internally, nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the eyes is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the eyes‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the ears is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the ears‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the nose is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the nose‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the tongue is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the tongue‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the body is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the body‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the mental faculty is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the mental faculty‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, sights is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, sights‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, sounds is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, sounds‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, odors is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, odors‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, tastes is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, tastes‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, tangibles is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, tangibles‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, mental phenomena is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, mental phenomena‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of the eyes is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of the eyes‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of sights is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of sights‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of visual consciousness is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of visual consciousness‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of the ears is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of the ears‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of sounds is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of sounds‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of auditory consciousness is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of auditory consciousness‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of the nose is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of the nose‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of odors is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of odors‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of olfactory consciousness is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of olfactory consciousness‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of the tongue is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of the tongue‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of tastes is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of tastes‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of gustatory consciousness is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of gustatory consciousness‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of the body is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of the body‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of tangibles is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of tangibles‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of tactile consciousness, is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of tactile consciousness‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of the mental faculty is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of the mental faculty‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of mental phenomena is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of mental phenomena‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, the sensory element of mental consciousness is simply a mere designation for something. Apart from being used conventionally as a mere name and conventional term, this designation for something‍—namely, the sensory element of mental consciousness‍—neither arises nor ceases. This name does not exist internally, nor does it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, in the same way, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term bodhisattva are simply mere designations for something. Apart from being used conventionally as mere names and conventional terms, these designations for things‍—namely, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term bodhisattva‍—neither arise nor cease. These names do not exist internally, nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, it is like this: inner body, for instance, is being used conventionally as a mere name. Bones of the head is being used conventionally as a mere name; bones of the neck is being used conventionally as a mere name; shoulder blades is being used conventionally as a mere name; bones of the shoulders²⁷¹ is being used conventionally as a mere name; bones of the spine is being used conventionally as a mere name; bones of the ribs is being used conventionally as a mere name; bones of the hips is being used conventionally as a mere name; bones of the thighs is being used conventionally as a mere name; bones of the shins is being used conventionally as a mere name; and bones of the feet is being used conventionally as a mere name. But these are simply mere designations for something. Apart from being used conventionally as mere names and conventional terms, these designations for things‍—namely, bones of the head, bones of the neck, shoulder blades, bones of the shoulders, bones of the spine, bones of the ribs, bones of the hips, bones of the thighs, bones of the shins, and bones of the feet‍—neither arise nor cease. These names do not exist internally, nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, in the same way, these‍—the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term bodhisattva‍—are simply mere designations for something. Apart from being used conventionally as mere names and conventional terms, these designations for things‍—namely, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term bodhisattva‍—neither arise nor cease. These names do not exist internally, nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“For example, Subhūti, it is like outer²⁷² grass, trees, branches, leaves, and petals. They are all expressed conventionally with their diverse names, but apart from being used conventionally as mere names and conventional terms, they neither arise nor cease. These names do not exist internally, nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, in the same way, these‍—the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term bodhisattva‍—are simply mere designations for something. Apart from being used conventionally as mere names and conventional terms, these designations for things‍—namely, the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term bodhisattva‍—neither arise nor cease. These names do not exist internally, nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“For example, Subhūti, simply the mere name of²⁷³ the blessed lord buddhas of the past remains.²⁷⁴ That name does not exist internally, nor does not it exist externally, and it cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“For example, Subhūti, all those phenomena of dreams, echoes, reflections, illusions, mirages, the moon’s appearance in water, and a magical display of the tathāgata are simply mere designations for something. Apart from being used conventionally as mere names and conventional terms, these designations for things neither arise nor cease. These names do not exist internally, nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two. Subhūti, in the same way, all those phenomena‍—the perfection of wisdom, a bodhisattva, and the term bodhisattva‍—are simply mere designations for something. Apart from being used conventionally as mere names and conventional terms, these designations for things neither arise nor cease. These names do not exist internally, nor do they exist externally, and they cannot be apprehended in the absence of the two.

“Subhūti, when bodhisattva great beings practice the perfection of wisdom in that manner, they should train in names and conventional terms that are designations, in advice that is a designation, and in phenomena that are designations.

“Subhūti, bodhisattva great beings who practice the perfection of wisdom in that manner do not observe that physical forms are permanent, and do not observe that physical forms are impermanent. They do not observe that physical forms are happiness, and do not observe that physical forms are suffering. They do not observe that physical forms are a self, and do not observe that physical forms are nonself. They do not observe that physical forms are at peace, and do not observe that physical forms are not at peace. They do not observe that physical forms are empty, and do not observe that physical forms are not empty. They do not observe that physical forms are with signs, and do not observe that physical forms are signless. They do not observe that physical forms are with wishes, and do not observe that physical forms are wishless. They do not observe that physical forms are conditioned phenomena, and do not observe that physical forms are unconditioned phenomena. They do not observe that physical forms are defilement, and do not observe that physical forms are purification. They do not observe that physical forms arise, and do not observe that physical forms cease. They do not observe that physical forms are void, and do not observe that physical forms are not void. They do not observe that physical forms are virtuous, and do not observe that physical forms are nonvirtuous. They do not observe that physical forms are basically unethical, and do not observe that physical forms are not basically unethical. They do not observe that physical forms are contaminated, and do not observe that physical forms are uncontaminated. They do not observe that physical forms are afflicted, and do not observe that physical forms are unafflicted. They do not observe that physical forms are mundane, and do not observe that physical forms are supramundane. They do not observe that physical forms are saṃsāra, and do not observe that physical forms are nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that feelings are permanent, and do not observe that feelings are impermanent. They do not observe that feelings are happiness, and do not observe that feelings are suffering. They do not observe that feelings are a self, and do not observe that feelings are nonself. They do not observe that feelings are at peace, and do not observe that feelings are not at peace. They do not observe that feelings are empty, and do not observe that feelings are not empty. They do not observe that feelings are with signs, and do not observe that feelings are signless. They do not observe that feelings are with wishes, and do not observe that feelings are wishless. They do not observe that feelings are conditioned phenomena, and do not observe that feelings are unconditioned phenomena. They do not observe that feelings are defilement, and do not observe that feelings are purification. They do not observe that feelings arise, and do not observe that feelings cease. They do not observe that feelings are void, and do not observe that feelings are not void. They do not observe that feelings are virtuous, and do not observe that feelings are nonvirtuous. They do not observe that feelings are basically unethical, and do not observe that feelings are not basically unethical. They do not observe that feelings are contaminated, and do not observe that feelings are uncontaminated. They do not observe that feelings are afflicted, and do not observe that feelings are unafflicted. They do not observe that feelings are mundane, and do not observe that feelings are supramundane. They do not observe that feelings are saṃsāra, and do not observe that feelings are nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that perceptions are permanent, and do not observe that perceptions are impermanent. They do not observe that perceptions are happiness, and do not observe that perceptions are suffering. They do not observe that perceptions are a self, and do not observe that perceptions are nonself. They do not observe that perceptions are at peace, and do not observe that perceptions are not at peace. They do not observe that perceptions are empty, and do not observe that perceptions are not empty. They do not observe that perceptions are with signs, and do not observe that perceptions are signless. They do not observe that perceptions are with wishes, and do not observe that perceptions are wishless. They do not observe that perceptions are conditioned phenomena, and do not observe that perceptions are unconditioned phenomena. They do not observe that perceptions are defilement, and do not observe that perceptions are purification. They do not observe that perceptions arise, and do not observe that perceptions cease. They do not observe that perceptions are void, and do not observe that perceptions are not void. They do not observe that perceptions are virtuous, and do not observe that perceptions are nonvirtuous. They do not observe that perceptions are basically unethical, and do not observe that perceptions are not basically unethical. They do not observe that perceptions are contaminated, and do not observe that perceptions are uncontaminated. They do not observe that perceptions are afflicted, and do not observe that perceptions are unafflicted. They do not observe that perceptions are mundane, and do not observe that perceptions are supramundane. They do not observe that perceptions are saṃsāra, and do not observe that perceptions are nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that formative predispositions are permanent, and do not observe that formative predispositions are impermanent. They do not observe that formative predispositions are happiness, and do not observe that formative predispositions are suffering. They do not observe that formative predispositions are a self, and do not observe that formative predispositions are nonself. They do not observe that formative predispositions are at peace, and do not observe that formative predispositions are not at peace. They do not observe that formative predispositions are empty, and do not observe that formative predispositions are not empty. They do not observe that formative predispositions are with signs, and do not observe that formative predispositions are signless. They do not observe that formative predispositions are with wishes, and do not observe that formative predispositions are wishless. They do not observe that formative predispositions are conditioned phenomena, and do not observe that formative predispositions are unconditioned phenomena. They do not observe that formative predispositions are defilement, and do not observe that formative predispositions are purification. They do not observe that formative predispositions arise, and do not observe that formative predispositions cease. They do not observe that formative predispositions are void, and do not observe that formative predispositions are not void. They do not observe that formative predispositions are virtuous, and do not observe that formative predispositions are nonvirtuous. They do not observe that formative predispositions are basically unethical, and do not observe that formative predispositions are not basically unethical. They do not observe that formative predispositions are contaminated, and do not observe that formative predispositions are uncontaminated. They do not observe that formative predispositions are afflicted, and do not observe that formative predispositions are unafflicted. They do not observe that formative predispositions are mundane, and do not observe that formative predispositions are supramundane. They do not observe that formative predispositions are saṃsāra, and do not observe that formative predispositions are nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that consciousness is permanent, and do not observe that consciousness is impermanent. They do not observe that consciousness is happiness, and do not observe that consciousness is suffering. They do not observe that consciousness is a self, and do not observe that consciousness is nonself. They do not observe that consciousness is at peace, and do not observe that consciousness is not at peace. They do not observe that consciousness is empty, and do not observe that consciousness is not empty. They do not observe that consciousness is with a sign, and do not observe that consciousness is signless. They do not observe that consciousness is with wishes, and do not observe that consciousness is wishless. They do not observe that consciousness is a conditioned phenomenon, and do not observe that consciousness is an unconditioned phenomenon. They do not observe that consciousness is defilement, and do not observe that consciousness is purification. They do not observe that consciousness arises, and do not observe that consciousness ceases. They do not observe that consciousness is void, and do not observe that consciousness is not void. They do not observe that consciousness is virtuous, and do not observe that consciousness is nonvirtuous. They do not observe that consciousness is basically unethical, and do not observe that consciousness is not basically unethical. They do not observe that consciousness is contaminated, and do not observe that consciousness is uncontaminated. They do not observe that consciousness is afflicted, and do not observe that consciousness is unafflicted. They do not observe that consciousness is mundane, and do not observe that consciousness is supramundane. They do not observe that consciousness is saṃsāra, and do not observe that consciousness is nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that the eyes are permanent, and do not observe that the eyes are impermanent. They do not observe that the eyes are happiness, and do not observe that the eyes are suffering. They do not observe that the eyes are a self, and do not observe that the eyes are nonself. They do not observe that the eyes are at peace, and do not observe that the eyes are not at peace. They do not observe that the eyes are empty, and do not observe that the eyes are not empty. They do not observe that the eyes are with signs, and do not observe that the eyes are signless. They do not observe that the eyes are with wishes, and do not observe that the eyes are wishless. They do not observe that the eyes are conditioned phenomena, and do not observe that the eyes are unconditioned phenomena. They do not observe that the eyes are defilement, and do not observe that the eyes are purification. They do not observe that the eyes arise, and do not observe that the eyes cease. They do not observe that the eyes are void, and do not observe that ‘the eyes are not void. They do not observe that the eyes are virtuous, and do not observe that the eyes are nonvirtuous. They do not observe that the eyes are basically unethical, and do not observe that the eyes are not basically unethical. They do not observe that the eyes are contaminated, and do not observe that the eyes are uncontaminated. They do not observe that the eyes are afflicted, and do not observe that the eyes are unafflicted. They do not observe that the eyes are mundane, and do not observe that the eyes are supramundane. They do not observe that the eyes are saṃsāra, and do not observe that the eyes are nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that sights are permanent, and do not observe that sights are impermanent. They do not observe that sights are happiness, and do not observe that sights are suffering. They do not observe that sights are a self, and do not observe that sights are nonself. They do not observe that sights are at peace, and do not observe that sights are not at peace. They do not observe that sights are empty, and do not observe that sights are not empty. They do not observe that sights are with signs, and do not observe that sights are signless. They do not observe that sights are with wishes, and do not observe that sights are wishless. They do not observe that sights are conditioned phenomena, and do not observe that sights are unconditioned phenomena. They do not observe that sights are defilement, and do not observe that sights are purification. They do not observe that sights arise, and do not observe that sights cease. They do not observe that sights are void, and do not observe that sights are not void. They do not observe that sights are virtuous, and do not observe that sights are nonvirtuous. They do not observe that sights are basically unethical, and do not observe that sights are not basically unethical. They do not observe that sights are contaminated, and do not observe that sights are uncontaminated. They do not observe that sights are afflicted, and do not observe that sights are unafflicted. They do not observe that sights are mundane, and do not observe that sights are supramundane. They do not observe that sights are saṃsāra, and do not observe that sights are nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that visual consciousness is permanent, and do not observe that visual consciousness is impermanent. They do not observe that visual consciousness is happiness, and do not observe that visual consciousness is suffering. They do not observe that visual consciousness is a self, and do not observe that visual consciousness is nonself. They do not observe that visual consciousness is at peace, and do not observe that visual consciousness is not at peace. They do not observe that visual consciousness is empty, and do not observe that visual consciousness is not empty. They do not observe that visual consciousness is with a sign, and do not observe that visual consciousness is signless. They do not observe that visual consciousness is with wishes, and do not observe that visual consciousness is wishless. They do not observe that visual consciousness is a conditioned phenomenon, and do not observe that visual consciousness is an unconditioned phenomenon. They do not observe that visual consciousness is defilement, and do not observe that visual consciousness is purification. They do not observe that visual consciousness arises, and do not observe that visual consciousness ceases. They do not observe that visual consciousness is void, and do not observe that visual consciousness is not void. They do not observe that visual consciousness is virtuous, and do not observe that visual consciousness is nonvirtuous. They do not observe that visual consciousness is basically unethical, and do not observe that visual consciousness is not basically unethical. They do not observe that visual consciousness is contaminated, and do not observe that visual consciousness is uncontaminated. They do not observe that visual consciousness is afflicted, and do not observe that visual consciousness is unafflicted. They do not observe that visual consciousness is mundane, and do not observe that visual consciousness is supramundane. They do not observe that visual consciousness is saṃsāra, and do not observe that visual consciousness is nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is permanent, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is impermanent. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is happiness, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is suffering. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is a self, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is nonself. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is at peace, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is not at peace. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is empty, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is not empty. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is with a sign, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is signless. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is with wishes, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is wishless. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is a conditioned phenomenon, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is an unconditioned phenomenon. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is defilement, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is purification. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact arises, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact ceases. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is void, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is not void. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is virtuous, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is nonvirtuous. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is basically unethical, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is not basically unethical. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is contaminated, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is uncontaminated. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is afflicted, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is unafflicted. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is mundane, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is supramundane. They do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is saṃsāra, and do not observe that visually compounded sensory contact is nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that feelings of happiness, or suffering, or neither happiness nor suffering, conditioned by sensory contact compounded by the eyes, sights, and visual consciousness, are permanent, and do not observe that they are impermanent. They do not observe that they are happiness, and do not observe that they are suffering. They do not observe that they are a self, and do not observe that they are nonself. They do not observe that they are at peace, and do not observe that they are not at peace. They do not observe that they are empty, and do not observe that they are not empty. They do not observe that they are with signs, and do not observe that they are signless. They do not observe that they are with wishes, and do not observe that they are wishless. They do not observe that they are conditioned phenomena, and do not observe that they are unconditioned phenomena. They do not observe that they are defilement, and do not observe that they are purification. They do not observe that they arise, and do not observe that they cease. They do not observe that they are void, and do not observe that they are not void. They do not observe that they are virtuous, and do not observe that they are nonvirtuous. They do not observe that they are basically unethical, and do not observe that they are not basically unethical. They do not observe that they are contaminated, and do not observe that they are uncontaminated. They do not observe that they are afflicted, and do not observe that they are unafflicted. They do not observe that they are mundane, and do not observe that they are supramundane. They do not observe that they are saṃsāra, and do not observe that they are nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that the ears are permanent, and do not observe that the ears are impermanent. They do not observe that the ears are happiness, and do not observe that the ears are suffering. They do not observe that the ears are a self, and do not observe that the ears are nonself. They do not observe that the ears are at peace, and do not observe that the ears are not at peace. They do not observe that the ears are empty, and do not observe that the ears are not empty. They do not observe that the ears are with signs, and do not observe that the ears are signless. They do not observe that the ears are with wishes, and do not observe that the ears are wishless. They do not observe that the ears are conditioned phenomena, and do not observe that the ears are unconditioned phenomena. They do not observe that the ears are defilement, and do not observe that the ears are purification. They do not observe that the ears arise, and do not observe that the ears cease. They do not observe that the ears are void, and do not observe that the ears are not void. They do not observe that the ears are virtuous, and do not observe that the ears are nonvirtuous. They do not observe that the ears are basically unethical, and do not observe that the ears are not basically unethical. They do not observe that the ears are contaminated, and do not observe that the ears are uncontaminated. They do not observe that the ears are afflicted, and do not observe that the ears are unafflicted. They do not observe that the ears are mundane, and do not observe that the ears are supramundane. They do not observe that the ears are saṃsāra, and do not observe that the ears are nirvāṇa.

“They do not observe that sounds are permanent, and do not observe that sounds are impermanent. They do not observe that sounds are happiness, and do not observe that sounds are suffering. They do not observe that sounds are a self, and do not observe that sounds are nonself. They do not observe that sounds are at peace, and do not observe that sounds are not at peace. They do not observe that sounds are empty, and do not observe that sounds are not empty. They do not observe that sounds are with signs, and do not observe that sounds are signless. They do not observe that sounds are with wishes, and do not observe that sounds are wishless. They do not observe that sounds are conditioned phenomena, and do not observe that sounds are unconditioned phenomena. They do not observe that sounds are defilement, and do not observe that sounds are purification. They do not observe that sounds arise, and do not observe that sounds cease. They do not observe that sounds are void, and do not observe that sounds are not void. They do not observe that sounds are virtuous, and do not observe that sounds are nonvirtuous. They do not observe that sounds are basically unethical, and do not observe that sounds are not basically unethical. They do not observe that sounds are contaminated, and do not observe that sounds are uncontaminated. They do not observe that sounds are afflicted, and do not observe that sounds are unafflicted. They do not observe that sounds are mundane, and do not observe that sounds are supramundane. They do not observe that sounds are saṃsāra, and do not observe that sounds are nirvāṇa.